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The International Seminar 2018

“Countering Violent Extremist Narratives in the Global Context”

at the Center for Strategic Studies, Royal Thai Armed Forces (CSS, RTARF)

Bangsaen, Chonburi, Thailand
FOREWORD

After the Cold War ended, Terrorism has changed significantly from politically motivated to ideological extremism, driven by religion and ethno-nationalism. Extremism, as part of the problem has also spreaded globally with the common theme “unstructured chaos” with the goal to co-op or coerce the targeted population to support their extremist ideology by systematically delegitimized the government, create anarchy, and gain control of the targeted population. Violent extremism could, there for, be stated as of the main driving forces of global terrorism.

Globally, violent extremists leveraged technology and communicated their concept of violence to their followers through various media, primarily social media such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc., and use languages tailored for their specific global audiences.

As the result, foreign fighters from around the world, including Muslims from England, France and Europe joined forces with the terrorist group who efficiently utilized extremist concept to fight for the caliphate.

Strategic Studies Center, National Defense Studies Institute, contends that “violent extremism and violent extremist narratives” is a global, regional and national challenge. Accordingly, the seminar on “Countering Violent Extremist Narratives in the Global Context”, aims to identify situations and trends of violent extremism and violent extremist narratives, as well as to seek ways to integrate cooperation for countering violent ideology by exchanging of experiences, approaches, and formulating strategies and directions for global and regional cooperation.

Strategic Studies Center
September 10th, 2018
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Welcoming Remark
Welcoming Speech by General Chaichana Nakkerd
Deputy Chief of Joint Staff, RTARFHQ, Kingdom of Thailand

“The Honorable Representatives from all nations.

On behalf of The Royal Thai Armed Forces, I am delighted to welcome you, our friends from ASEAN, ASEAN Plus Countries and others. I am very happy to be here, in this excellent evening with friendship and warm atmosphere, to welcome all of you.

First of all, let’s me thank you for your participation for our seminar and discussion today.

Today, we have working hard. I would like to express my deep appreciation for your dedication during the day. I am sure that we have been doing a good work. But, tomorrow, we will do the best work. We will finish the meeting beautifully tomorrow.

Therefore, I, as the representative of the Royal Thai Armed Forces Head Quarter; would like thank you for your participating to this event and thank you all of the SSC’s staff for arranging a very nice place for our seminar and dinner today.

And, now, may I propose the toast for our coming era of peace, mutual trusts, more-and-more prosperity, and ensured security for all the people of the world. Cheers.”
Opening Remarks
Report by Major General Apisak Sombatcharoennon 
Director of SSC, NDSI, RTARFHQ

“Ladies and gentleman, as we are waiting for our guest speakers. So, last night, some of you’ve already checked into the hotel while some of you have just checked in this morning, so we wish your stay here would be a pleasant one.

So let me begin the function, General Chaichana Nakkerd, the Deputy Chief of Joint Staff, the Royal Thai Armed Forces, on behalf of the Strategic Studies Center, the National Defence Studies Institute, I would like to express my highest appreciation to General Chaichana Nakkerd for coming to preside over the Opening Ceremony for the International Seminar 2018. For this year, the Strategic Studies Center conducts the seminar on the Countering Violent Extremism Narratives in the Global Context. The goals of this Seminar are to enhance the awareness and understanding of situation and trend of violent extremism and violent extremism narratives, which I think is an innovative thought and perspective among the Meeting’s forums, academic institutions, military officers, Government official, think tanks, and other prominent guests on the topics to find innovative approach and effective strategies for countering violent extremism and extremism narratives, to create an opportunity for promoting academic cooperation between ASEAN and the others. There are totally 159 participants from 22 countries, including participants from ASEAN nations, ASEAN-Plus nation, and others namely Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, China, France, India, Italy, Kenya, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States and of course from Thailand. The participants of each country are from various sectors such as government sectors, non-government sectors, public sectors, and academic sectors.

The Seminar will be divided in 3 important sessions. The first session is the Honourable Guests’ keynote speeches by distinguished guest speakers from Thailand, China, and the United States of America. The second session is the session from various participants on the “Countering Violent Extremism Narratives in the Global Context” presented by the United Kingdom, Bangladesh, France, India, Pakistan and Australia. Lastly, the third one is the panelist discussion on the “Countering Violent Extremism Narratives: ASEAN Perspective” from Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam.

With this special opportunity, I would like to invite General Chaichana Nakkerd, Deputy Chief of Joint Staff, the Royal Thai Armed Forces, to give the opening speech for the International Seminar 2018. Please, sir.”
“Good morning,

Honorable guest speakers, distinguished delegates, Ladies and gentleme

On behalf of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, it is my great pleasure to welcome you all as distinguished guests to Thailand and the International Seminar 2018.

Since the end of the Cold War, terrorism has developed into a different type of threat than we have witnessed before. During the Cold War, terrorism was mostly related to the fights between two opposite ideologies. In the post-Cold War era, terrorism is now infused by extremism ideology which combines both religious and ethnic conflicts. Today, the strategy of extremism and ideology are widespread on social media, so these groups are using Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to spread their message to followers. The most successful use of social media by a terrorist group can be seen by Islamic State or IS. This manages to attract fighters to the Syrian Civil War and help integrate Lone Wolf attacks in Europe and America.

The International Seminar aims to explore the current and future trends of extremism ideology in the world, and hopes to find a coordinated solution in countering violent extremism narratives at the global, regional, and national level. Most important (ly), this Seminar presents the guests and the committee from all the 22 participating nations the opportunity to work together and share experience in order to achieve the same goal. Lastly, I would like to thank our moderator, honourable guest speakers, and all the distinguished guests for dedicating your time and efforts into this Seminar. Taking this opportunity, I now declare the International Seminar on Countering Violent Extremism Narratives in the Global Context to be officially opened. Thank you.”
Opening Speech by General Chaichana Nakkerd, Deputy Chief of Joint Staff
Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters

Group Photo: General Chaichana Nakkerd, Deputy Chief of Joint Staff, RTARFHQ
NDSI Representative, Director of SSC, Guest Speakers, and Panelists at conference room
the Convention hall.
Countering Violent Extremist Narratives
by Keynote Speakers
General Wanlop Rugsanaoh, Secretary-General of the National Security Council Office of the National Security Council, Kingdom of Thailand

General Wallop Rugsanaoh, Secretary-General, Office of the National Security Council, the Kingdom of Thailand, has a very extensive education background, namely artillery course from the United States, the Command and General Staff Course from the United Kingdom, and Peacekeeping Course from Australia. Formerly the Director of the Directorate of Joint Operations, the Royal Thai Armed Forces, General Wallop Rugsanaoh was also appointed the Director of Policy and Plan, the Office of the Permanent Secretary for Defence.

The General begins by mentioning about his visit to the United Nations Headquarters in New York to attend the 1st High Level Conference of Head of Counter-Terrorism Agencies of Member States. The conference discussed and shared ideas for all nations to have one strategy to counter terrorism worldwide, with focus on many aspects including Counter Violence Extremism or CVE. However, the UN calls is subject “Prevent Violence Extremism.”

The Secretary-General starts with the topic on terrorism and violent extremism situation. For the last four years, the world has been facing with the re-emergence of terrorist threat. With the rise of the Islamic States or IS, the global community witnesses the widespread violent extremist ideology. Unlike the terrorist threat of the Pre-IS era which was easier to identify who are the threats, the Post-IS terrorism opens the possibility that everyone can be a terrorist. This was mostly the result of two main factors. First is the advancement of telecommunication technology, especially the social media platform and encrypted communication application that allow radical groups to communicate with their followers. The second factor is the prolong grievances among vulnerable groups which drive them towards the use of violence to achieve their goals. These two factors create fertile ground for terrorist groups such as IS to plant and cultivate violent ideology throughout the world. As technological advancement makes violent ideology spread faster, the battle to put an end to such spread is under the responsibility of the international community to work together in addressing the problem and making the world a safer place.

The next section is about the situation about terrorism and violent extremism in Thailand. Up to the present, there has been zero evidence suggesting that Thai citizens have been radicalized and submitted themselves to terrorism ideology. There have been very few instances that the authority discovered Thai people consuming IS propaganda through social media platform. However, there have not been any cases of sympathizer actually planning to carry out attacks or planning to travel to conflicted areas. Thailand’s security agencies are monitoring their movements closely. Despite having said that, the country truly recognizes that no country is truly immune to the spread of violent extremism, and thus is on the
lookout for any potential threat. What concerns Thailand at the moment is that the country has been facing with different kinds of the spread of violent ideology, which is completely unrelated with the spread of terrorism. It is believed that radical groups have distorted and falsified history including Islamic teachings to indoctrinate children and youth with violent ideas, especially armed struggle against Thai state. The narrative of “Thai State’s mistreatment of the local population” was used to stimulate people to mistrust and oppose Thai government. Once realized that using violence or hard measures would only increase hatred and bring about even more violence, Thailand has been using the combination of security measures, development projects, political process as well as rehabilitation with the aim to stop violence and the spread of violent ideology, and to promote sustainable peace and prosperity in the area.

Apart from on-ground security personnel, the government has been implementing projects to elevate the livelihood of the local population in conjunction with establishing infrastructure to attract internal and foreign investments. This is to serve a wider policy of transforming southernmost border provinces into “Sustainable Security and Prosperity Triangle” by linking three major townships of the region and create an economic hub that would drive economic development and tourism in the long term. Political process, meanwhile, is also the key to create sustainable peace in the region. This is why representatives from the Thai government are having a Peace Dialogue with all groups. The rehabilitation process, which aims to help people who were radicalized and involved with the movement to be able to go back and live a normal life in the society, is also an equally important aspect. Hence, the Government has initiated the “Bring People Home” project to give these people a chance to give up fighting and to go through judicial and rehabilitation process and to finally be reintegrated into the society. The Royal Thai Government has set up the Peace Operation Center especially for this purpose. This center combines the use of interpretation of Islamic teaching by respectable religious teachers to promote correct and peaceful understanding, while at the same time give them better understanding of the motivation of the government in trying to solve this problem. These show the Royal Thai Government’s efforts in addressing and approaching the situation from every dimension: economic, socio-cultural and security dimension and engaging every sector to take part in this effort. Despite zero linkages between the movement in Thailand with global terrorists or Jihadist network, if the country does not build immunity and prolong the situation, in the future outside forces can take advantage of the situation which could turn into a fertile ground for cultivating violent extremism and terrorism.

Coming back to the issue of CVE in counter-terrorism context. At the national level, Thailand is in the process of creating a national action plan on Countering Violent Extremism. Following the United Nations Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, the “National Counterterrorism Plan”, not only focuses on response to terrorism, but also on the prevention and recovery after the incident. For the first time, this plan addresses the issue of countering every form of violent ideology as one of the key elements in preventing terrorism. It outlines that this effort can be done through 4 dimensions: 1) Stopping
the spread of violent ideology in Social Media, 2) Creating immunity and resilience for communities against radicalization, 3) Promoting moderate ideology and the use of peaceful means to pursue goals, and 4) Creating de-radicalization program which aims at social re-integration. In Thailand’s perspective, CVE is not only about countering violent ideas; it will be most effective when surrounding conditions that enable hatred and violence to grow are addressed. This meant that CVE must be of a whole government approach and, every government agencies must take part in this effort.

Apart from that, Thailand has been working hard to deal with another force that put Thailand at risk of violent extremism that is organized crime network, especially counterfeit travel document and passport syndicates. Moreover, as a tourism and transit hub, Thailand is believed to be used by terrorist groups and foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) traveling in and out of this region as well as a haven to conduct their illegal activities. The country has employed an effective screening system as well as increasing our intelligence cooperation with foreign counterparts in order to be able to identify and deal with these kinds of threat more effectively and accurately.

Thailand may be very fortunate to be less affected by global Jihad ideology and terrorism. However, no country is immune from violent extremism and no country can work alone to fight the spread of terrorism and violent extremism. Therefore, CVE should be a global agenda, which every country must join hands in fighting together and helping each other to protect their people, especially youth from this threat. Violent extremism must be combated from the root causes which are conflicts, grievance, marginalization and discrimination. Mechanism that would hinder the spread of violent extremism through Internet and social media as well as building resilience for the people must be in place.

During the Q&A and comment session, a participant from India poses the question regarding the wide use of social media in spreading violent extremism ideology and his comments regarding the importance of geo-politics. The keynote speaker then replies that for Thailand, the authority has asked for cooperation from social media operators and tried to monitor any suspicious movement. Regarding the geo-politics aspect, ASEAN has formed a joint monitoring mechanism with cooperation in CT and prevention of extremism with a wide range of partnership namely intelligence, training and military security. While Professor Blaxland from the Australian National University (ANU) asks about the interjectory of violence in the Southern Border Provinces Thailand and the future level of violence. General Rugsanaoh then answers that the situation in the area has improved as seen from the reduced violence, the people’s better understanding of the officials. Recent visit of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) also put Thailand as the example for multicultural society. The Director of the Thailand-China Strategic Research Center, the National Research Council of Thailand, meanwhile expresses his concern on ASEAN’s ability to control Big Data.
Major General (Retired) Zhang Jianguo, Vice Chairman of China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS), People’s Republic of China

Major General Zhang Jianguo, Vice Chairman of China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS) earned his Master’s Degree from the University of Miami, United States of America. Some of his remarkable tenures during his career includes an Attaché to the Chinese Embassy to Yugoslavia, an officer to the United Nations, a United Nations Military Observer, and Military Attaché to the Chinese Embassy in the United States, and Defence Attaché to the Chinese Embassy of Great Britain and Ireland.

The Current International Counter-Terror Situation and Characteristics of the Network Activities by Violent Extremists is divided into 3 aspect. The 1st one is the Current International Counter-Terror Situation. After the collapse of ISIS, the over-spilling effect of violent terrorism is outstanding, with violent extremists speeding up their evacuation and committing crimes back in their home countries, and violent terrorist activities operating on high levels. The international community is still confronted with multiple new challenges in the field of counter-terrorism. The Middle East and South Asia remain the major “deflagration points” of violent extremist activities while Iraq and Syria have continued to fight hard against the violent extremist forces including ISIS and reclaimed huge pieces of lost territories, but there are still lots of violent terrorists existing in those countries. The violent terrorist forces in Afghanistan have made a strong comeback, which has seriously interrupted the peace process in Afghanistan. Pakistan has actively promoted the “national counter-terror action plan” while the situation in its western regions and tribal areas remain pessimistic.

Many of the Jihadist fighters from Southeast Asia fighting in the Middle East have returned home. African countries such as Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria and Niger have seriously undermined “Boko Haram” militants. However, the “ISIS” has continued to make large scale terrorist attacks in Egypt and Somalia to manifest its existence. Recently, there have been more than 50 violent terrorist attacks of various kinds occurred in Western countries like the U.S. the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Belgium, many of which have been launched by native violent extremists in “lone wolf” style, causing great panic among the local residents.

The “ISIS” has accelerated its transformation from a “state” to an “organization”, while al-Qaeda is secretly gathering strength to stage a strong comeback. Currently, the ex-“ISIS” fighters or violent terrorists are busy evacuating and returning to their home countries, actively engaging in spreading their extreme religious ideology and violent terrorist
techniques worldwide through internet, and trying to instigate violent extremists in various countries to perform “lone wolf” attacks. Al-Qaeda has taken the opportunity to gather strength in an attempt to stage a strong comeback and regain its leadership in global Jihad.

Like many other countries in the world, China is also a victim of terrorism. Currently, the uppermost and most realistic terrorist threat to China comes from the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), also known as the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP).

The second part is Major Characteristics of the Network Activities by the Violent Extremist Forces. Aware of the difficulties in the real world, violent extremist groups have began to take more active postures in the virtual world, attaching more importance to the strategic significance of the Internet. The violent extremist forces have not only seen the network as an important tool for recruitment, fund-raising, and publicizing its violent extremist ideology, but also taken it as an important direction for future transformation of its mode of operation, form of organization and concept of development. Presently, the internet has become a new battlefield to fight against the violent extremist forces.

First, the violent extremist forces have publicized their extremist ideologies and recruit followers through social media and network communication tools. The violent extremist forces have maintained their operation and plotted terrorist activities through social media and internet as social media and internet have provided the violent extremist groups with safe, convenient and speedy ways to launch attacks and escape from retaliation. Third, the violent extremist groups have attacked key infrastructure through networks by trying to paralyze and undermine the network systems of key infrastructure as civil aviation, railroad, power and finance. Fourth, the violent extremist groups have attacked the websites of critical departments through networks. The violent extremist groups have tried to smear the image of a nation and interrupt its service by paralyzing the websites of its key departments, or spreading false and violent extremist information to cause chaos and panic.

The next part is on Measures to Be Taken by the International Community to Counter the Network Threats by the Violent Extremist Force. It is the common responsibility of the international community to confront violent extremism. Therefore, countries in the world should strengthen cooperation and take the following measures to jointly fight against violent extremism. First, new technologies should be used to build situational awareness system of the network threats posed by violent extremism. Second, the offensive and defensive capacity against the network attacks by violent extremists should be raised continuously. Third, propaganda should be strengthened to eliminate the network influence of violent extremists. Fourth, efforts should be made to strengthen international cooperation and information sharing, and set up cooperative defense mechanism. Fifth, efforts should be made to further encourage the mass to action as to build the counter-terror defense line in networks.
China is a victim of terrorism, but at the same time it is a participant and contributor to the international anti-terrorism cause. In recent years, China’s major approach and experience in countering violent extremism are as follows: attaching great importance to the role played by the people in fighting against violent extremism, strengthening supervision and management of the extreme religious thoughts on the Internet, solidifying inter-departmental cooperation within the government and forming a holistic counter-terror strategy; trying to eradicate the soil that breeds violent extremism, and strengthening international cooperation in countering violent extremism.

China has always supported the United Nations in playing essential and deep roles in international anti-terrorism narratives. Currently, China has established cooperative mechanism for counter-terror with more than 20 countries in the world. China has also got deeply involved with the anti-terror task forces of the United Nations, the regional organization in Asian and the BRICS and other multinational cooperation mechanisms like Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, making important contributions to the international fight against terrorism. The keynote speaker also reiterates that China will continue to participate and promote bilateral and multilateral cooperation in countering terrorism. China is more than willing to make common efforts with all the countries in the world, especially the ASEAN countries and promote the realization of regional and global peace and stability.
Mr. Richard Sears, Dean of Admissions and Business Operations  
Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies  
(DKI APCSS) United States of America

Mr. Richard F. Sears is the Dean of Admissions and Business Operations at Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. He joined the DKI APCSS in July 2002. He serves as the Chairman of the Department of Transnational Studies in the College of Security Studies where he’s responsible for CT forum to implement the comprehensive security response to terrorism courses.

For his keynote speech, Mr. Sears stresses on the fact that there is still so much work to do in countering violent extremism. He also emphasizes on the 200 years of friendship between Thailand and the United States. Apart from being security allies, the two nations’ ties are based on trust, friendship, and common goals for the region, including security, prosperity, and stability. As the threat of violent extremism in Southeast Asia poses to become an obstacle to achieve such goal, policy with the government and all concerned parties are important.

According to significant issues on countering violent extremism narratives were raised a few weeks ago when the United Nations held the meeting on CT. This meeting revealed proper goal including international cooperation, and information sharing for the ability to find new partnership and solutions. From the fightings in Iraq and Syria, extremism has changed while returned fighters go to different parts of the world including Southeast Asia.

The first step for every participating country is to cooperate and to coordinate efforts to cope with the challenges, moreover learnt and thought about the issues to move forward together. The ability to identify and to successfully harmonize multiple diplomacies and common goals is also important, as narratives only have realizable moments when they can bring about actions in responding to violence. It has political legitimacy placed in itself. These narratives, he reveals, will help achieve the unachievable. The global community must strive against extremism narratives, and demonstrate how to react when faced with extremism, supported by collateral activities and perpetrating against the violent ideology of their message, which is the fruit of unemployment, lack of education, or government corruption. The issues that let these problems take roots must be addressed. The keynote speaker also expresses his views that it’s widely acknowledged that this is a difficult task, but it’s a natural one and everyone must re-challenge.
On the second part, The international community’s goal is to find balance for them and purpose which requires inclusive, multi-faced purposes for the society. And it is required to do this with all ability and legitimacy. Government, meanwhile, shouldn’t ride off the individual will. Resources and efforts will be very much needed, but the message is clear: civil society; education; law enforcement, etc. will help play a part in reducing the risk in individual’s life. Also, on the prospect of family, the importance of bonding the family together is recognized. Supporting family and education are distinguished narratives to turn to, especially among returned fighters, if they have support from families. Also, showing clergy as educator plays a part as this is necessary to destroy falsified information. All these aspects are equally important in the kind of counter narratives. To those being vulnerable, hope for job, education, and a method of success, even the method to evaluate that success is highly debated, the common efforts should focus on bringing in efforts to identify the counter programs and for best practice.

For the 3rd part is “how the global community seizes and searches for dignity, human rights, and freedom”. As human beings, if one allows fear to take roots, that individual could be rid of opportunities, which will make way for extremism narratives. Legitimacy, stable security, government’s policies and individual opportunity along with tougher law, more enforcement, etc, all of these are what the world needs in countering violent extremism narratives.

Nowadays with technology capability, it can be quite a struggle to fight against these narratives. As a very powerful, potentially intrusive instrument, everyone must be careful when using it, for example, technology and cyber tools are enormous system, and we may use it to change these narratives. But at what cost, as the global community wants to tackle such narratives, but also wants to preserve the rights of citizen. If they don’t get this done right, it can’t be working. In his words, he then hopes that every party concerned will share cooperation along with the change which takes place rapidly and lessons-learned.

Finally, the question about “how to strengthen the cooperation between related nations”. And most importantly, how to trust one another more? The answer is that cooperation and bilateral partnership at various levels from the United Nations, ASEAN as well as through other mechanisms should continue to have bilateral and multilateral engagement. Different prospects need to be understood and if the mutual cooperation goes on, networks to look at the prospect must be organized. The method of information sharing should also be implemented, as an example, at Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies has a CT network with 15,000 alumni, which means there is the network for sharing information, best practices, and collaborative projects with the goal to help, practice, and generate to the government. He concludes his speech by expressing his acceptance that there is a way to move forward, However, based on his professional experience, cooperation is the key.
Countering Violent Extremist Narratives by Keynote Speakers

General Wanlop Rugsanaoh (Kingdom of Thailand)

Major General Zhang Jianguo (People’s Republic of China)

Mr. Richard Sears (United States)
Countering Violent Extremist Narratives in the Global Context
Ms. Margaret Tongue, Deputy Head of Mission British Embassy
United Kingdom

The challenge of extremism is admittedly a very complex one, even non-violent extremism can be dangerous. It starts on the ground of radicalization. When one look at the details or the background of victims of extremism, it’s quite clear that there’s a process of influence. But at the same time while countering violent extremism, it’s quite important to balance the right of individual to free speech, to give them the space to express their views. In the United Kingdom, its counter extremism strategy to fight extremism is attached to its fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance and different race or belief. This is because the Government believes that opposing fundamental values such as democracy, promoting discrimination, sectarian segregation and privileging white identity and objection to the rights of individual actually creates violence where extremism can flourish. These narratives are used to justify hatred, spread intolerance, erode the rights of women and minorities, and actually isolate communities. It is noticeable that encouraging free speech and debate is one of the most powerful tools that the authority has in preventing terrorism extremism narratives from getting involved. In the United Kingdom, the strategic approach to tackle extremism is based on the nation’s 4 pillars: first, vigorously countering extremism ideology, making sure that every part of Government is taking action to confront extremist narratives. Secondly, actively supporting engagement especially in communities. Thirdly, disrupting the most conflicted roots and prosecuting those who break the laws, and finally, building more cohesive communities by tackling segregation and feelings of annihilation that provide fertile grounds for extremism. Those 4 pillars are boiled down into “The Prevent Program”, the program to counter extremism consisting of 4Ps: Prepare to mitigate the impact of extremism attacks; Protect the people from terrorist attacks; Pursue to stop terrorist attacks, and Prevent to counter terrorism ideology, and to stop people from leaning towards terrorist ideology.

The Prevent approach is fundamentally about safe approach and support to vulnerable individuals, to stop them from becoming terrorists or terrorism supporters, and through early intervention, to identify and offer support and also, for those who have already gone down that root, to disengage. The speaker meanwhile highlights 3 key strategies, one is about approach, second is what we do with the communities, and finally to talk about the online matter. So firstly, in order to become successful, there is the need between communities that has just been talked about, even what lies between phases of extremism is different. All the researches show that there’s no single factor that determines what’s radicalized. There’s a social factor and demographic providers. But terrorism comes from broadening background and becomes interpreted in different ways. And, in the United
Kingdom, there are background factors which make the vulnerable multiply. This includes the involvement in criminal activities, experience, ideology, etc. Most individuals who experience these factors may even face more factors to become involved in terrorism factors as those are productive factors that prevent them from doing so. Hence, this may be about setting priority in their lives, about personal community organizers. But a small number of people don’t have these protective factor, and that could be a range of sociological issues. Countering extremism in different countries can then be very difficult to understand in terms of what drives radicalization or extremism in those countries.

The second point is that the successful intervention has to be a comprehensive approach, meaning that it has to involve the community. It is not something that the government can do on their own. It’s critical that the Government has to share with communities and civil service groups as well as public sectors and private sectors in order to tackle the cause of radicalization and rejecting the violent extremism narratives. So, the Prevent Program starts a very engaging local work with communities and organizations. The government has supported civil service organizations across the United Kingdom to develop a wide range of projects working with the schools and the local communities to build immunity from the risk of radicalization. The British Government supported about 181 community-based projects last year which reached 88,000 individuals. As part of building some community resilience, it has been working for inclusive diversity with social organization. To be at the most effective, the organizations aim at grassroots. But those are the organizations that understand what needs are in the communities. There ‘s actually one case study of an organization founded almost 30 years ago in the community of London. It focuses on development projects, particularly through sports to reach out to young people and help them find the opportunities. And for the last few years, the Prevent Programme has been working with this organization in the project called “Building Community’s Resilience”, with the goal to develop various resilience. The mentioned organization works in which it creates an environment where difficulty can be discussed, including workshops where counter extremism narratives including ideologies are discussed. The project also seeks to develop future narratives to beat the challenges of violent extremism ideas. And for the individuals identified as most vulnerable, the organization can offer one intervention, which again looks at deconstructing extremism narratives.

Finally, the risk of online radicalization. In Europe, threats of radicalization can be very quick. And the Internet of course is the powerful tool which can be exploited by terrorists to spread their ideology and propaganda. It is then very challenging to counter violent extremism narratives online. The solution is working with industries in particular to avert the dissemination of terrorism content. So, the United Kingdom has been at the forefront of the battle tackling terrorist content online by working with the police, the industry and the international partners. As an example, the authority set up a peace counter terrorism internet
and forum unit which manages to seize and secure 300,000 pieces of terrorist contents on the Internet. But to meet with the pace and the scale of the spread of the propaganda online, the technology aspect has to come from the industry. Following the attack in Westminster last year, the British Government has been working with social media providers including Facebook, Google, and Microsoft to see what’s more to be done to keep terrorism from going online. And this led us to establish the Global Internet Forum in Countering Terrorism (GIFCT), the International Industry Forum. Ideally, the industry will remove the contents and ultimately stop new contents from getting to users. So far considerable progress has been perceived in terms of the technology which is used to identify and remove online terrorism contents. In December 2017, Google announced that 98% of its video contents could be identified. Facebook, meanwhile, said it found million pieces of Al-Qaeda content during the first quarter. Twitter also announced this April that over 40 million accounts have been suspended due to violation on the basis of anti-terrorism.

Furthermore, the work of research information in which there is an agency on the strategic communication within the United Kingdom’s Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism to ensure that the British Government’s communicating strategy is against the idea of terrorism. It also aims at addressing the unprecedented contents in the pace, the scale, and the sustainability of countering violent extremism narratives. The authority also finds the way to transcend down to root problems, with network and counter group supporting social media platform and helping to respond to 50 million engagements by click, share, and comment. And one of the things it does is to create alternative measures online. Additionally, industry can provide funded partnership while civil society provides people and platform to voice. And that’s how the British Government is trying to respond to the challenge.
Violent incidents throughout the course of history which is, evidently, the consequence of violent extremism. The issue of violent extremism, however, is not solely the end-product of terrorism. Indeed, it is actually the by-product of singularity which is found in both secular and religious discourses. Professor Ahmed then provides several examples of figures in the world’s history who made use of singularity to gain advantage for their own purposes, namely Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini who provoked and instigated the extreme idea of singularity in the name of race, resulting in millions of deaths. Other examples of singularity in India, conflicts between the Buddhism and the Bengalis fightings in Muslim countries, etc are the evidence of how extreme singularity, under the disguise of race, can produce such violent outcomes.

There are 2 questions related to the topic. The first question is on whether the narrative of violent extremism deter or reproduce violent extremism whereas the second question asks why the narrative of violent extremism receives renewed attention in contemporary time. The second question, is easier to answer.

From the statistics that in 2012, a death toll of 56 million people across the globe was recorded. Their cause of death varies, some from man-made violence while some from suicide, especially in developed nations. Figures from the year 2017 show that non-communicable diseases (NCDs) are the cause that kills the world population the most. However, when compared to the figures of terrorist-related killing (statistics from 2012), it is found that only 7,697 people lost their lives for this cause, which is still lower compared to those passed away from NCDs and suicide.

There are raising the wonder on why we tend to fear the threats of terrorism than NCDs like diabetes or obesity when the latter kills more people than the former. The answer lies in the fear itself, which leads to intolerance. Giving a more clarification answer to the work of Carl Jung’s “Collective Unconsciousness and Archetypes.” According to Jung, we are being driven by archetype of singularity, fear, and intolerance which has been inside us. The archetype can rise spontaneously at any time or any place. The best way to eradicate or counter such concept is to find the way to understand it, to defy, and to overcome singularity.

Many people across the world have tried to do it as it is the state of the mind with multi-layers. It then requires multi-verse intervention in focusing on that person. As a solution, the theory of contemporariness or Prasangika is implemented. The idea of fear
is presented in the form of a mandala, which is a set of circles of one after other. One can only find a way out of this never-ending circle by being empowered in either (or all) politics, economy, society, technology, and psychology.

To sum up, it depends on how one creates the mandala to build the archetype. If one decides to build up more fear instead of security, what that particular person is doing is indeed expanding the fear. And from one person comes two, three, and more, and that becomes the issue as now the archetype of singularity, fear, and intolerance is taking over the world.
For the 1st part, the 1st “supplier” of foreign fighters to IS. These people carry different motives in joining the terrorist group, some do it in the name of Jihad, some in the name of religion. Despite the diversity of motives, there are common denominators that could be traced among these French foreign fighters which are, first of all, they usually are young people from specific age group between 18-26 years old. An absence of the father is the next denominator. Finally, about 50% of them come from the suburb of Paris known in French as Le Banlieue, and when combined with the rate of unfinished education, all of these factors lead to emotional deficiency which makes these young people prone to falling prey to extremism narratives.

Consequently, the usual types of returnees, or returned fighters from the wars in Iraq and Syria: the traumatized; the repented; the undecided, and the convinced. For the 1st category, these people are traumatized by the conflicts and by what they have seen in Syria and Iraq, especially the massacre and the decapitation. They also need medical care. The 2nd category or the repented are those who regret what they have seen. Generally, they try to forget those memories and get back to normal lives. The next, the undecided, are the ones who become skeptical. They don’t really know whether they should give up or abandon the idea of extremism. And the last category, the convinced, is the type that brings together radicalized people who still keep the same violent extremism ideology. Certainly, they are the most dangerous category, but at the same time they seem to be the minority. Most of them choose to remain in Syria to fight and to die for Jihadism. The panelist then suggests there are ways of management for radical jihadists. It’s a new situation as Europe has never faced so many returns of fighters like this before and most nations are at their perplexity. France, for example, doesn’t know what it should do, either keeping them together or separating them. By unifying the fighters, the country may face the risk of the second fight and the process of radicalization. By separating them, and the country may be prone to the risk or dissemination of the spread of jihadism idea. The prison services have the tendency to individualize the sentences, and propose the specific pathways for ex-jihadists based on their sociological profiles. Meanwhile, one of the biggest difficulties faced by most of the French jails is the concept on “how to isolate the convinced jihadists?” when the convinced returnees are so high. Sometimes the number could be up to 200 persons in some prisons.

The next part is on the prevention and countering violent extremism in which he proposes 3 steps of identifying recruiters; countering narratives of hatred and mistrust, and other themes on primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention. Generally, on France’s stance,
the idea of coming up with projects that could improve the social conditions is needed. And to get a better accomplishment, or specifically, to put out any possibilities of people falling prey to radicalization, French authorities provide fundings for debates, conferences, exhibitions, which focus on the diversity. They also focus on young people who are identified as in the process of radicalization. Early in the process, links from competent individuals and psychologists are made with these young people. On the next proposal on countering narratives of hatred and mistrust, the panelist emphasizes on France’s determined actions to fight against what disrupts the safety of citizens. It however may not be exactly the idea of prevent; it is, indeed, more like a security aspect.

Guidelines towards the counter-narratives. to fight against complex issues, and various stages need to be identified such as identifying recruiters which is proven to be an effective way. Looking further on the issue about the recruits themselves, these people feel zero sense of national belonging. When pondering closely, questions such as why the minorities, or why the ones from the Suburbs may be raised. Once these grounds are understood, it is quite hopeful that everyone will be able to solve the issue altogether.

In countering violent extremism, once the authority manages to understand the aspects combined as the fertile ground for radicalization, it may realize that among jihadists, the young people are actually looking for identity in the context of uncertainty. Also, as France has the biggest Muslim, Jewish and Buddhist communities in Europe, there is then the possibility to boost these people’s self-esteem. For many young people, IS has been seen as the initiative to involve in a big project. The proposal as the counter-measure to violent extremism, is that the world should go back to the roots. As the most diversified country in Europe, France is known of long-standing legacy and history which should be educated to the young so that they will get a better knowledge of their own.
To begin, there have always been conflicts around the region. But what is currently in the focus is the ability to interact on violent issues, and he is calling everyone to be part of the dialogue. It is fortunate to him and to many that having a lot of friends who understand the international political concerns helps a great deal in generating cooperative mechanisms through dialogues and discussions.

Regarding the context of history, conflicts as the result of extremism have already taken place since the times of the Soviet Union’s times in Afghanistan. Seeing the opportunity after the weakening force of the Soviet Union, the United States took Afghanistan matter under its hands. Traditionally, the United States has had its hand on the security aspects in South Korea, Vietnam, etc. in the course of history. But what has been happening in Afghanistan is a different matter. The Islamic State, or the Islamic Forces that we have known has expanded its ideology across the region, even to the Philippines and Indonesia. The ideology concentrates on radicalization of thoughts which have led to violent occurrence in many parts of the world.

Radicalization, as many may have already known, has brought consequences in which everyone is facing challenges. The global community is facing the phenomenon in the new face of terror. Looking at India’s context, the country is officially not suffered from such threat. However, as people could come across in the region. It is then advisable that the State of any country should have counter measures. The panelist then proposes several counter-measures beginning with, first of all, upholding the majesty or the rule of law. In India, it is quite essential that the authority makes the law enforceable, and that the people respect it as not to disrupt other people. The next counter-measure is that corruption needs to be eliminated, which is quite understandable in uplifting and strengthening the credibility of the authority. Next, the panelist proposes the counter-measure of generating participatory decision-making and empowering civil society. The system in India is very vibrant and alive. Hence, participation from all the sides concerned will be welcomed. The next measure is the effective socio-economic alternatives to violence. On this regard, India’s society that the country is growing rapidly with high economic growth. However, this type of growth is not the only criteria in indicating the well-being of the people or serving as the preventive measures. Socio-economic alternatives are then required in order to ensure that the livelihood of people in the society is taken care of. For the next counter-measure, the idea of strengthening the capacity of local government is suggested as local authorities can reach out easier to their people.
Consequently, there are 5 more counter-measure ideas. Beginning with the idea of supporting credible internal intermediaries to promote dialogue, including with former extremists, Major General Banerjee cites the example from the US in which, according to General David Petraeus, there is no right or wrong; it is just the problem of those who study from different points of views, which would then make these the useful platform for dialogues. The next counter-measures include promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment as women play a great role in many aspects of the society, from inside a family household to outside; engaging youth in building social cohesion, which, when judged from the context of the society, could be a challenge as there could be social gap among the country’s young generation. The last two proposals as the counter measures are working with faith-based organization and religious leaders. In this regard, the panelist reiterates that religions and beliefs are fundamental, and that the right understanding, along with tolerance is effective in bringing about harmony. The last proposal is promoting human rights, diversity and a culture of global citizenship (Vasu Dhaye Kutumbakkau) On this aspect, he also elaborates to the previous Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore that it is important to learn how to adopt and approach.

Regarding the issue of internet and social media. Certainly, the platform can be a negative one in terms of obscurity. But thy are also the useful tools if managed correctly. At the same time, the global communities need to be aware of preparing for regional and international cooperation when needed in countering violent extremism narratives as well.
From the statistics from the Global Terrorism Index 2017, there is the ten most impacted countries from terrorism are Asia and Africa. He then moves on to talk about the sequences of his presentation, which begins with the causes of global violent extremism, types of extremist ideologies, violent extremism narratives, countering global violent extremism narratives, and lastly, causes of radicalization in Pakistan and counter-measures which are conveyed through the story and history of Pakistan.

On the causes of global violent extremism, are classified in 2 levels of macro and micro. The former is further divided into political, economic, cultural, and social media aspects whereas the latter is divided into social and individual. Political oppression along with Western foreign policy and military intervention could lead to extremism whereas economic deprivation and poverty are the two major causes of extremism. Cultural aspect meanwhile cites discrimination, marginalization, and prejudices as fertile grounds leading to extremism. Social media, as the new communication platform, manages to reach unreachable individuals easier. That nevertheless also exposes them to distorted ideologies faster. When looking at the micro-level causes of extremism, when a member of a group thinks that (s) he’s being treated unfairly, that could expose the person or the group to the ideas of extremism. On individual aspect, if a person is exposed psychological trauma or even PTSD, that person has a higher chance to embrace extremism.

Besides, the types of extremist ideologies is catagorised in 5 cores: zionism, anti-semitism, neo-Nazism, Islamophobia, and rise of Hindutva or Hindu nationalism. Dwelling only briefly on this topic, the violent extremist narratives are spread actively through the dissemination of “a mix of ideological, political, religious, social and economic narratives, based on a range of real or imagined grievances.” Violent ideology is also spread broadly due to the use of technology and social media platform such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and What Sapp.

In countering global extremist narratives, the panelist suggests 6 approaches of uniform laws; change of perception, which emphasizes on the fact that violent extremism goes beyond the realm of Islam; role of the United Nations in maintaining global peace and security; address political and economic grievances, which, to put simply, is to tackle communities’ political and economic difficulties; use of soft power namely targeted campaigns to counter
extremism narratives, and de-radicalization programs to help those falling prey to the extremism ideology as well as providing them psychological counseling.

The causes of radicalization and counter measures in the context of Pakistan, the unique geographical position of the country as it lands at confluence of South Asia, Central Asia, Middle East, and the Persian Gulf. Throughout the course of modern-day history, Pakistan finds itself caught in the conflict as it shares the border with Afghanistan. It was then weakened by the fights and hostile powers due to interest beginning from the arrival of Mujahedin fighters against the Soviet Union to the influx of Afghan refugees. Other factors which render Pakistan in dire positioning are the overlapping borders and villages, concentration and training camps, and the AK-47 culture and drugs trafficking.

Before the 9/11 incident, the United States gained victory, but the freedom fighters who entered Afghanistan were not accepted back by their motherlands. The Cold-War conflicted area has then turned into a hotbed of extremism and the aftermath of 9/11 has pushed Pakistan to become the frontline for the United States and the entire global communities in the fight against violent extremism. Pakistan has sacrificed a great deal in terms of loss of lives, stability, and the people’s sense of security. However, according to the panelist, despite his country’s utmost efforts in countering the threats of violent extremism, the international community keeps pushing for the “Do More” attitude for Pakistan.

The country meanwhile has been doing the best it could in countering the threats of violent extremism as well as participating in the international efforts to make the world the safer place. Operations in support of coalition forces in the fight against extremism have been conducted. Check points and fences along its border with Afghanistan have also been constructed. Apart from military cooperation, Pakistan has also focused on developing political, legal, economic and infrastructure aspects in an attempt to spread prosperity and well-being to residents, including the expansion of education and healthcare. Pakistan’s de-radicalization programs also contributes a great deal in reducing the number of violent incidents.

Finally, Pakistan contribute towards global peace, as seen from its participation in the United Nations’ peacekeeping missions in which Pakistan is the largest peacekeeper contributors, and from the Pakistan Navy’s role in maritime security operations. There are, nevertheless, several aspects that are still disrupting Pakistan’s ultimate path to peace. One is the dispute on Kashmir while the other is the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)’s inability to become truly independent as it is bound by politics.
In 2001, the 9/11 incident put the whole world in the so-called global war on terror. Allied with the United States, Australia deployed personnel from the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and assets in Afghanistan with the expected period to last about 6 months. Currently, they are still there. Shortly afterwards, the Bali Bombing took place in Kuta, killing a great number of Australian nationals. This was a wake-up call to Australia to face with the prospect of violent extremism. The country felt the need to reach out more regionally beginning with the Indonesian police in which it later co-established the Joint Jakarta City Law Enforcement Cooperation, which is currently still in operation. Later in 2004, the tsunami disaster actually put the hope that perhaps extremist groups can be brought to integrate in the society judging by the joint efforts taking place in Aceh.

Things start happening again within Australia’s neighbourhood, particularly in the development and seizure of Marawai in the Philippines. It caught the country a big off guard as the countering insurgency campaign is remarkably similar to what happened in Mosul, Iraq. Despite the absence of violent incidents like in France or the United Kingdom, Australian agencies decided to form joint bodies in countering violent extremism, with contributing agencies not only from the Australian Defence Force, but also from the Australian Federal Police, Australian Border Forces, criminal intelligence, and transport security. Professor Blaxland emphasizes on the need to think holistically about strategies, and reveals that at first the authority thought it was on the right track by engaging with the community. However, the question on how to engage with people without making things worse in the culturally-sensitive way is raised. Massive expansion of police in many sectors have then been taking place, and, thanks to intelligence units joining hands together, many terrorist plans have thwarted.

The common theme in countering violent extremism consists of the emergency of helping people in need, disengaging people from extremism, building community’s resilience, providing education program, communicating effectively in countering violent extremism, and supporting alternative narratives is addressed. The government, meanwhile, has to play a vital role. It takes a long time, but the effort is slowly going on the right track.

In terms of intelligence architecture, Australia aims to engage more offshore, not just only with neighbouring countries, but also with Asia, the Middle East, and even Europe. On
this part, he provides the reason that we’re now living in a more connected society; a YouTube video posted in Brussels can be watched in Sydney or Melbourne in just a few minutes. Hence, international engagement is very important.

Regarding the idea that, back in the past, Australia would refer to the idea of “security from Asia.” These days, however, the preposition of “from” is changed into “with” as the country is more connected to the region than ever in which Australia is engaged in several regional initiatives to foster the idea of security and stability as key background for facilitating prosperity. Around last year, a new organization was formed from intelligence and security bodies. This newly-formed unit has then been cooperating with regional countries like Indonesia, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea and beyond such as Thailand and Brunei to counter regional extremism initiatives.

Apart from Australia’s approaches on countering violent extremism, an idea on other topics of interest in which the subject he chooses to focus on is the Rohingya crisis. There is of course no indication that these people will be radicalized. However, they have what is known as the “ingredient for radicalization.” People’s anger is perceived, but the world keeps on looking away. Hence, the Rohingya crisis is a genuine one and a humanitarian disaster. It requires major collaborative international ventures, either from ASEAN, the United Nations, or other states such as Japan, China, India and even Australia to work bilaterally or multilaterally to solve the issue.

Finally, All countries need to work together on various issues. The ability to trust and to work together is important as there is no magic potion that will solve the challenges. Only creatively, collaboratively, and elaboratively engaging with one another will solve the problems of dissatisfaction, but it will have to certainly go a long way to produce the prospect of further countering violent extremism.
Presentation of the Speakers on
“Countering Violent Extremist Narratives in the Global Context”

Ms. Margaret Tongue (United Kingdom)

Mr. Elyamine Settoul (France Republic)

Professor Imtiaz Ahmed (People’s Republic of Bangladesh)
Major General (Ret.) Dipankar Banerjee (Republic of India)

Major General Muhammad Samrez Salik (Islamic Republic of Pakistan)

Professor John Blaxland (Commonwealth of Australia)
Countering Violent Extremist Narratives:
ASEAN Perspective
Ms. Yura Suman Adnan, Head of Research Division, Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (SHHBIDSS) Ministry of Defence (MINDEF), Brunei Darussalam

Similar to other countries in the region, Brunei strongly opposes to terrorism in all kinds of forms and rejects extremism and radicalism. Furthermore, it supports efforts with the international community to prevent all kinds of extremism activities, especially the related international conventions and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Despite zero direct terrorist treats on its soil, Brunei is fully aware that any countries in Southeast Asia could be used as trafficking point and safe haven for funding as well as being prone to radicalization.

The majority of Brunei’s population are Muslims. Hence, the potential risks of radicalization which could be done by altering Islamic faith and teaching is a great concern that deals directly with the country’s peace and stability. The country also features a large group of young population aged between 25 to 54 years old with high number of Internet access and of social media. Aware of the online radicalization scheme, Brunei tries to raise awareness as well as better equipping the community with cyber knowledge.

At the national level, similar to other nations, Brunei relies on inter-agency coordination and operations under the National Security Committee. Legal instruments and frameworks are also in place at national and international levels to cover all aspects regarding terrorism and violent extremism.

The panelist also highlights preventive measures in countering violent extremist narratives that fit with the country’s social and cultural context. One of the highlights is the coordinated efforts in religious affairs in which the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Brunei Islamic Council and State Mufti Department work together in upholding and defending Islamic faith and teachings in accordance with what’s indicated in the country’s Constitution. These ensure standardization and consistency of knowledge. Actions, namely standardized religious education and screening of religious preachers, are implemented as well.

The power of online accessibility in which information can be easily reached through social media. Thanks to Brunei’s small population and close-knit families and community, this unique environment helps support the Government’s preventive strategies. For instance, the community can be made aware of religious activities that may not be consistent with Islamic faith and teachings practiced in Brunei. The public also plays an important role in alerting the authority of any suspicious actions.
The units in charge of religious affairs and the public have always shared close ties. Religious outreach meanwhile has been in practice since 1950s whereas the Ministry of Religious Affairs’ religious institution has fostered strong relations with the community. Coordinated actions, namely dialogues and consultations as well as online platform and hotline are provided to the public as the means to prevent early intervention to counter any deviant practices and beliefs. Additionally, religious scholars with various types of Islamic knowledge are also at hand for scholarly discussions. All of these are to ensure the right interpretation of Islamic faith and teachings as not to make way for extremism.

Moreover, education and awareness among the youth play a key part in Brunei’s preventive measures. Strong religious and education foundation as well as community outreach programs are implemented to install values based on universally-accepted aspects ensuring justice, harmony, tolerance and help to others. There is also a non-conscript programme for youth which aims at instilling in them the sense of patriotism, building resilience, and strengthening their understanding of the country.

Apart from national approaches, Brunei also values the cooperation with other countries at both bilateral and international levels in addressing challenges. Domestically, the Ministry of Defence is in charge of intelligence and information sharing whereas the Royal Brunei Armed Forces is tasked with countering any security threats to Brunei.

At regional level, ASEAN plays a considerable role in addressing the threats from violent extremism through cooperative platforms under ASEAN frameworks, namely the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings on Defence, Transnational Crimes, and Telecommunications and Information. Also, the ASEAN Leaders Statement on Cybersecurity cooperation highlights the region’s commitment and recognition to generate further cooperation.

Countering violent extremism narratives requires comprehensive engagement using existing platforms. Interaction and exchanges at various levels between law enforcement and security agencies as well as other related parties are required in order to understand the challenges and to share best practices as well as find cooperative solutions together. The panelist also touches on Brunei’s commitment to work with other countries through bilateral, regional and international cooperation.
Captain HEK Lygenta, Assistant to General Department of Research and Intelligence (GDRI), External Operation Department
Kingdom of Cambodia

Regarding the situation in Cambodia, despite the number of several ethnic groups and Muslims, issue of extremism or violent extremism never occurs in the country. However, the General Department of Research and Intelligence has recently set up Counter-Terrorism Office to oversee the matter. Cambodia, meanwhile, shares the view that Southeast Asia can be used as a transit place for terrorists to hide out, plan attacks, recruit members or transfer funds. Threats from extremist groups are real and could happen in this region due to a number of factors, namely returned Jihadists from the Middle East, or allegiance pledged to ISIS by local extremist groups in Southeast Asia such as Abu Sayyaf, Maute, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, and Ansar Khilifah. Violent incidents have been taking place in the region, namely the seize of Marawi City in the Philippines by the Maute, or the recent bomb attack in Jakarta, Indonesia. There are terrorist group linked to ISIL in which the Jemaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), which pledged allegiance to ISIL in 2014, was behind the church attack in Surabaya, Indonesia carried out one family.

The topic on Transiting Terrorism, under this aspect, Cambodia can be used as a place for safe haven as well as transit hub for trafficking weapons, fund transfer, and training ground. Also, the spread of radicalism is made easier with the use of social media platforms namely Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc. in which extremists earn followers and recruits as well as publicizing their ideology. Topics of the extremists’ financing methods along with Cambodia’s case study on the apprehension of Hambali, the leader of Jemaah Islamiyah group and the mastermind of the Bali bombing in 2002.

Narrowing the topic down to the current perspective and approaches by Cambodian authority, there are roughly 600,000 Muslims in Cambodia, with mosques and religious schools nationwide. They are nevertheless perfectly assimilated with the mainstream society. They have the freedom to go to religious schools, to practice their beliefs, and to wear hijab. Presenting the photos of the Cambodian Prime Minister with the Muslim community, the panelist emphasizes on the Royal Cambodian Government’s attempt to maintain peace and solidarity in the country. In Cambodia, everyone has the same right to choose religion and so far, Somdet Hun Sen, the Prime Minister of Cambodia, conveys his commitment to foster solidarity, as seen by his words of congratulations on the month of Ramadan and his participation in the dinner with the Muslims.
Cambodia may not be affected by significant extremism. However, it feels the need to have some related measures in place in order to cope with the growing threats of extremism. In this regard, the Royal Cambodian Government has implemented legal frameworks, namely establishing the National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCTC), the NCTC Secretariat, and the National Counter-Terrorism Special Force (NCTS), cooperating with partners on counter-radicalization initiatives, and promoting harmony. Captain HEK’s direct unit, the General Department of Research and Intelligence (GDRI), has recently formed the Counter-Terrorism Office with focus on terrorism matters. Moreover, the Royal Cambodian Senate has passed several laws in an attempt to prevent extremist activities to flourish, namely the Law on Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting the Finance System Related to Terrorist Groups, and the Law on Counter-Terrorism.

Finally, the Royal Cambodian Government’s commitment is to any movements or actions of extremist and terrorist groups. Despite zero violent or terrorist incident on its soil, Cambodia will, with its utmost efforts, maintain the peace and stability in its country as well as responding to the threats of extremism. Also, following the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting in Singapore in February, Cambodia aims at enhancing cooperation with its regional partners in counter-terrorism. The cooperation can be divided into 4 aspects of: to update and share new experience and knowledge regarding terrorist and violent extremism; to organize the information-sharing system through a secure platform which will provide analysis, information on terrorism development and updates; to organize joint training on countering terrorist forces recruitment and propaganda on the cyber space, and to organize a tracking mechanism regarding the operation and suspicious financing activities of terrorist and violent extremism.
First Admiral Dr. M. Adnan Madjid S.H., M.Hum, Vice Dean of National Security Faculty, Indonesian Defence University (IDU) Republic of Indonesia

In countering violent extremism narratives, the Government of Indonesia realizes that it requires a strategic approach which should combat the main cause of violent extremism, including intolerance, corruption and failure of the State, political issues, economic factors, and social marginalization. Furthermore, it is essential that engagement with relevant players, particularly local communities, professionals, and non-governmental agencies is fostered to ensure that violent extremist narratives cannot be formed.

Citing the data of terrorist attack during 2010-2015 from the Terrorism Study Center and Social Conflict, University of Indonesia, the figures show descending number in 2014 and 2015. The panelist then elaborates on Indonesia’s measures and approaches in countering violent extremism narratives. For the 1st approach, the network-based Conflict Early Warning and Response System (CEWERS) is introduced. This approach is created from the analogy that conflict is a cycle and can then be divided into conflict prevention step(s), intervention to stop violence, negotiation to bring peace, and effort to develop peace in order to establish long-term resilience. Under the framework of CEWERS activities, the analogy actually works by producing in-depth analysis from components and processes that bring about conflicts and peace in the past, or “Conflict Background Report”, followed by the stage of “Current Condition Report” which deals with producing in-depth analysis from components and processes that generate conflicts and peace in the present. The two analysis are melted down into CEWERS Report, which predicts future conditions by using trend and analysis from what has happened in the past and the present. The prediction is later used for scenario building before turning into report.

The next approach is the education program of Bele Negara (Defence the country). Launched by the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, the programme targets nationals to increase their sense of belonging and interest to their country. It actually emphasizes on the citizen’s right in national defence and security. Under this program, the people’s effort in defending the nation is boosted through civic education, basic military training, etc. In the Doctrine of State Defense, the Defense Ministry Regulation, Bela Negara comprises 5 key elements: love and defend for the country; awareness of the nation’s diversity; upholding in Pancasilla as the ideal basis and the 1945 Constitution as the constitutional foundation, willingness to sacrifice for the nation, and early ability in mental and physical aspects to defend states.
The idea of Bela Negara is a combination of the Soft and the Hard Powers into Smart Power. Seeing the United States’ failure in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Republic of Indonesia also realized that the use of hard power would even make the community lose its trust. In regards of soft power, the authority was fully aware how powerful the power of mass media and social media is, and how opened interaction and dialogues with communities play a part. It then combines those realizations into the Smart Power which highlights community engagement strategies, cooperation between the Government and the community to achieve the goal of establishing social resilience and doing countering violence extremism.

For the conclusion, from Indonesia’s own approaches, the most important practices are to form engagement and relations with local communities. Trust, he highlights, needs to be gained between local communities and governmental agencies which can be done through CEWERS framework. Other approaches that he touches on also include empowering the community, making the community and the youth aware of diversity and harmony, analyzing and fixing the root causes as to prevent the spread of radical ideology, and putting the right direction for the media as not to create misconception towards violent extremism.
Currently, the problem of radicalization focuses on IS and Muslim militants. After the wars in the Middle East, these people come back to the region and participate in incidents in Southeast Asia. However, Southeast Asia is not directly linked to IS; it is indeed the counter narratives. However, the title “Islamophobia” or fear of Islam stresses on the fear element in Islam. To many people, they see Islam as a violent religion, and also those who practice Islamic beliefs. On this, the panelist raises the question on how many Muslim friends each individual has before elaborating on his views. According to him, the world hasn’t done much justice to Islam. It is not a monotheistic religion; indeed, it has got progress throughout the course of history.

For the panelist, it is actually the policy that tries to undermine Islam. Many people may find it hard to understand, but what happened in Afghanistan can be viewed as the challenge against foreign operations in the people’s own homeland. It is extremely important that military measure is not the only means implemented to solve the problem. He also touches on the situation of Muslims in Europe as well in which Muslim immigrants are often labelled as part of terrorist entity, and states that Americans are killed by home-grown Right Wing than Muslims.

Professor Hamzah then urges participants to face up with the “inconvenient truth”, which means that the fightings that have occurred are done by the locals who fight to win back their lands, their education or against suppression. Hence, the best way to tackle the threats of extremism should, first of all, begin with the right understanding of how the conflict begins.

In ASEAN contemporary context, the panelist stresses on the urgency to find the way to fight against the problem of misunderstanding together. Fightings, which have erupted in different parts of the world such as Uganda could be of different causes, which by no means has zero connection to Islam. If the global community still regards Muslims as violent, that means it hasn’t really looked into the problem attentively enough, or understood the real cause.
In countering violent extremism narratives, firstly, the cycle of extremism needs to be understood. Like any living mechanism, it has its global limitation in which participants could try to find its dominant trend, concept, propaganda or, the “Trident.” This process, in the panelist’s own term, is known as “Finding Order in Chaos” as one may have to make his/her way through a lot of factors and aspects related to extremism.

The topic of technology could provide both advantages and disadvantages. It could play a great part in disseminating information, but at the same time, it could pave the way for cyberterrorism as well as the spread of violence ideology. Further more extremism is divided in 4 aspects which are recruitment, radicalization, returnees, and recidivists. Improved tactics used by violent extremist groups is found that the groups have developed a trend of learning curve in which they pivot to the next level of security, namely the use of plastic bombs as well as the tactic of using family as weapons as in the case of the Surabaya bombings.

Next is the topic on psychological drivers based on case study in Singapore in which there are similar patterns and ideologies in the minds of those who are, or would-be radicalized namely the romanticised notion of Utopian, the desire to be a good Muslim, and the escape from the unbearable world. Radical ideology makes use of an individual’s emotion, namely piety, sympathy, etc. At the same time, the extremist groups tend to adjust their means of attack and strategy in which new trends such as CBRE attacks, guerilla-style tactics, modus operandi, recovery attempts after failed operation, and recidivists and deportees are recorded. The characteristics of deportees which are usually those who travel to the conflicted lands in order to join the fight. They are, however, stopped and stuck at Turkish borders before being sent back to their home countries. They have to move back and try to assimilate into the society again. Style of committing violent extremism acts is also touched on, namely Lone Wolves, MTFA, mass slaughter, and small cell.

Moving on to prevention against the threats from violent extremism, the panelist firstly emphasizes on the network jointly formed between military, law enforcement, and security agencies, grass-root organizations, educational institutes, and various related agencies. Diving down in Singapore’s context, she states the first three challenges of Singaporeans’ unreadiness in facing with terror attacks, the society’s widespread use of
social media, and multi-faceted threats namely world events, released of radicalized prisoners, self-radicalization, and divisive teachings that divide the society’s harmony.

Once realized how these notions take place among the would-be radicalized, the Singaporean authority designs the rehabilitation programme based on 4 key messages. Firstly, Singapore is a multi-racial and multi-religious society. Secondly, it is a secular state with democratic process. Thirdly, it upholds in the respect for common space. And fourth, as it is a small state, there’s low threshold for violence and terrorism. The rehabilitation programme is then designed regarding 3 components of psychological, social, and religious aspects. For the psychological rehabilitation programme, traditional approaches like assessment and counseling play the key part whereas the social rehabilitation programme focuses on providing opportunities and support as well as promoting the ties within family. Singapore’s rehabilitation programme, meanwhile, combines both the secular context and the technological aspect together in which the panelist introduces RRG or Religious Rehabilitation Group. Formed by volunteer Islamic scholars and teachers, the group provides religious counseling to detained JI members as well as building immunity for community. It boasts the core aims of Correct, Assist, Prevent, and Support and provides the resource and counseling centre where individuals can come in for a visit or schedule for an appointment. Furthermore, it also launches its own mobile application as a platform to chat with religious scholars and book to visit the Centre.

Singapore pay wan effort in bringing in community to engage in countering extremism ideology. Out of this effort, the Inter-Agency Aftercare Group (ACG) is formed comprising 4 self-help groups to oversee matters in families, financial, emotional and social support, and reintegration process for detainees. The Singaporean authority’s effort in forming joint efforts with the community is also emphasized as seen by the concept of SGSECURE. Under this initiative, every community joins together in the movement to protect itself from terrorist attack. SGSECURE is also available as mobile application.
In recent years, violent extremism is rising globally and in Southeast Asia in particular. After defeats in Iraq and Syria, militant groups have enhanced dissemination of violent extremist narratives in Southeast Asian nations with the aim of radicalization, recruitment and fundraising. Their activities are posing serious threats to regional security in the region, which requires every country to join hands in tackling the issue.

Internet and social network meanwhile play a part in disseminating violent extremist narratives, which generates hatred among individuals, and urge them to engage in anti-government activities disrupting public peace and prosperity.

In Southeast Asia, some local communities face with unequal development not only in the economic, cultural and social realms, but also in intellectual levels and social activities between people living in urban and rural areas as well as between those living in flatland and mountainous areas. People from ethnic minorities, in particular, still face a lot of difficulty in socio-economic development. This is the opportunity for violent extremist organizations to disseminate their narratives and to eventually create pretexts for intervention or even spark riots and social insecurity.

For Vietnam, it is a multi-racial and multi-religion country with 54 ethnic groups, 6 major religions which have about 20 million followers, and other small religious groups. It has implemented the policy on promoting harmony between ethnic groups and religions as well as ensuring equality to maintain national solidarity. Vietnam believes that many causes, namely poverty, gap between urban and rural societies, etc. can lead to the proliferation of violent extremism in Southeast Asia. Having identified causes for violent extremism, countries therefore need to analyze the nature and causes of violent extremism in order to find holistic solutions to the problem. For Vietnam, the country also values adopting policies on social security, building community resilience, and fighting against hunger, poverty, and social injustice.

However, one of the challenges that hinders the coordinated efforts in countering violent extremist narratives in the region is the difference in terms of concept of violent extremism. Hence, this requires every related part to hold talks and discussions to reach an agreement on the concept of “violent extremism.”
In regards to the Internet, its accessing power means that no nation can deter any information or what’s posted online, which include contents containing violent extremism ideology. The panelist then proposes the solution that law enforcement agencies from different nations need to strengthen cooperation in controlling and countering websites with violent extremist narratives content, including terrorism, improving bilateral and multilateral mechanisms, and regularly holding regional and international forums for information sharing, experience exchange and finding approaches to counter violent extremist narratives. Moreover, cooperation between governments as well as between governments and major Internet companies is of significant importance.

Furthermore, it is crucial to enhance education to immunize people from the influence of violent extremism narrative as well as informing them of racial and religious policies of states. In the panelist’s perspective, this is the best way to counter violent extremism as there is a need to reach out, look after, and provide for the people deemed most vulnerable.

That the fight against violent extremist narratives in Southeast Asia has achieved initial results. However, as long as violent extremist organizations and radicalization exist, there will still be the need to prevent the people from the threats of violent extremism. Nations should then come up with comprehensive measures to promote solidarity and harmony. Education and campaigns to raise people’s awareness of violent extremist narratives along with enhanced international cooperation are also required.
Presentation of the Panelists on “Countering Violent Extremist Narratives: ASEAN Perspective”

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Captain HEK Lygenta (Kingdom of Cambodia)
First Admiral Dr. M. Adnan Madjid (Republic of Indonesia)

Professor Dr. Hamzah bin Ahmad (Malaysia)
Dr. Jolene Jerard (Republic of Singapore)

Lieutenant Colonel Cao Dinh Vu (Socialist Republic of Vietnam)
Moderator: Air Marshal Saisak Kanpachai (Kingdom of Thailand)
Closing Remarks
Summary Speech

Major General (Retired) Zhang Jianguo, Vice Chairman of the China Institute of International Strategic Studies, gives the conclusion remarks on the International Seminar. He firstly extends his felicitations to the event, which is a very fruitful, instructive, enlightening and successful one. Elaborating on the topic of CVE, he expresses hope that participants can take back what has been learnt and discussed during the 2-day event and adjust them to their countries’ context as he is fully aware of each country’s differences and common grounds. Major General Zhang once again stresses on the fact that in today’s world, no country is immune to the threat of violent extremism, and that no country can stand alone in fighting against such threat. Violence come in many faces, but what is important is that the global community should never let themselves deter by singularity, fear, and intolerance. Comprehensive cooperation among international communities, along with inter-agency coordination, general public, and family all play a particular role in the solution to extremism. He also emphasizes that poverty along with religious and racial conflicts are proven to be the hotbed for extremism. Hence, preventive measures which include education and job will help narrow the gap whereas modern technology, if used correctly, can aid in the fight against violent extremism. Lastly, he passes on his thanks to the Strategic Studies Center for organizing this seminar and for the excellent organisation, arrangement, and hospitality as well as to the Royal Thai Armed Forces, the participants, the speakers, the mediators and the support team.

Mr. Richard Sears, Dean of Admissions and Business Operations, Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI APCSS), presents his compliments to the panelists and stresses on the importance of cooperating together which is the key to solve terrorism and to truly bring peace and prosperity to the region. He also adds that means like security cooperation and intelligence-sharing are also essential in fighting against terrorism. Throughout the 2-day event, discussions are generated with interesting views and shared experiences. The challenge, however, lies in adapting into the local context as what they have learnt in the seminar may not fit every country. Nevertheless, the key is to share best practices and lessons learned. Moreover, he suggests that after this event, there should be a kind of forum where participants can go in and share their experience to help each other. He also touches on the importance of trust before ending his conclusion with utmost appreciation extended to the Strategic Studies Center, the staff, and the friends who share the wonderful time together.

Major General Apisak Sombatcharoennon, Director of Strategic Studies Center, National Defence Studies Institute, Royal Thai Armed Forces, presents his warmest appreciation to the Deputy Chief of Joint Staff for presiding over the Closing Ceremony of the International Seminar. He then comments that during the 2-day event, lively and interesting discussions have been made in which all the information and innovative thoughts will be brought back to justify and adapt to each country’s context as every country has the commitment to make the world a better place for the next generation to come.
“Honorable guest speakers, distinguished delegates, Ladies and gentlemen,

Almost the past 2 days of our international seminar on “Countering Violent Extremist Narratives in the Global Context” has not only proved to be a fruitful discussion, but also a tremendously invaluable experience.

The results of the meeting highlight the importance of the integration of cooperation against the spread of extremism, violence and radicalization, due to the concept of violence, extremism or radicalization is the backdrop or bone of terrorism in every region of the world. Therefore, the international community should cooperate to eliminate the root causes of such a belief; especially, unfair treatment and unjust practice in society, as well as inequalities in economic, social and political playing ground – so as not to allow the concept of violence, extremism or radicalization, to spread widely and eventually lead to terrorism.

Once again, the Royal Thai Armed Forces would like to thank you all for dedicating your precious time to this seminar, and we sincerely wish you a safe and pleasant journey home.

I now officially declare this seminar as closed. Thank you.”
Other Activities
In recent years, with the joint efforts of the international community, the “ISIS” has been badly hit in Iraq and Syria, and the international war on terror achieved great progress. Presently, although the “ISIS” is gone as a “state”, it still exists as an organization and the violent extremist ideology it advocates still lingers, which has made terrorism one of the uppermost security threat to the international community.

I. The Current International Counter-Terror Situation

After the collapse of the “ISIS”, the over-spilling effect of violent terrorism is outstanding, with violent extremists speeding up their evacuation and committing crimes back in their home countries, and violent terrorist activities operating on high levels. Fighting against violent extremism with forces cures only the symptoms but not the disease. Coupled with the impacts of game played by big powers and geopolitical factors, the international community is still confronted with multiple new challenges and new problems to cope with in the field of counter-terrorism.

A. Global violent extremist activities are occurring with high frequencies, while the Middle East, South Asia, Africa and Southeast Asia remain the regions where violent extremists run rampant. There were about 2400 violent extremist attacks occurred globally in 2017, inflicting more than 18000 deaths and 20000 injuries in total, which was about the same with those of 2016. Currently, global violent extremist activities have the following features:

First, the Middle East and South Asia remains the major “deflagration points” of violent extremist activities. Both Iraq and Syria have continued to fight hard against the violent extremist forces including the “ISIS” and reclaimed huge pieces of lost territories, but there are still lots of violent terrorists existing in those countries. Moreover, the sectarian and ethnic contradictions within these countries are very prominent and the regional security situation is still not optimistic. The violent terrorist forces in Afghanistan have made a strong comeback, continuing with violent terrorist activities, which has seriously interrupted the peace process in Afghanistan. Pakistan has actively promoted the “national counter-terror action plan”, with the counter-terror situation improving as a whole in its eastern regions,
while the situation in its western regions and tribal areas remain pessimistic.

Second, under the influence of the “ISIS”, Southeast Asia and Africa suffer from growing violent terrorist activities. Many of the Jihadist fighters from Southeast Asia fighting in the Middle East have returned home, which has worsened the counter-terror situation in the Philippines and Indonesia among others, while the “ISIS” is still seeking to expand its sphere of influence to Southeast Asia. African countries such as Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria and Niger have joined hands in killing and capturing close to 3000 “Boko Haram” militants, which has seriously undermined its strength. However, the “ISIS” has continued to make large scale terrorist attacks in Egypt and Somalia among others to manifest its existence. Countries within these regions cannot effectively stop the infiltration and expansion of the violent terrorist forces by themselves alone.

Third, Europe and the U.S. face a “new normal” of violent extremist activities. Recently, there have been more than 50 violent terrorist attacks of various kinds with trucks, knives, guns and explosives occurred in Western countries like the U.S. the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Belgium, many of which have been launched by native violent extremists in “lone wolf” style, causing great panic among the local residents. Of late, terrorist attacks have occurred frequently in European countries and America, which the counter-terror departments of these countries can hardly cope with effectively, resulting in the fact that they will have to face long-term and realistic threats from violent extremism.

B. The “ISIS” has accelerated its transformation from a “state” to an “organization”, while al-Qaeda is secretly gathering strength to stage a strong comeback.

With the “ISIS” badly beaten, its entity as a “quasi state” in Iraq and Syria has been extinct. Currently, the ex-“ISIS” fighters or violent terrorists are busy evacuating and returning to their home countries, actively engaging in spreading their extreme religious ideology and violent terrorist techniques worldwide through internet, and trying to instigate violent extremists in various countries to perform “lone wolf” attacks. Its organizational structure and development strategy tend to emphasize development in a horizontal, loose and networked way. Al-Qaeda has taken the opportunity, when the international community is concentrating on fighting against the “ISIS”, to gather strength in an attempt to stage a strong comeback. Al-Qaeda has insisted on an localization development strategy and a tactic of “restraint” actions, trying to stay away from the “ISIS” that indulges in killing innocent people and foster a moderate (compared with the “ISIS”), pragmatic and anti-West image in its propaganda to strive for a broad support from the Muslims. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda has also actively attracted the fugitives of the “ISIS” and supported Bin Laden’s 28-year-old son Hamza as its leader to take over his father’s cause. Under the impact of the abovementioned tactics, al-Qaeda has enlivened its activities in the Middle East and South Asia, showing its strong intent to regain its leadership in global Jihad.
C. The violent extremist ideology has got spreading globally through internet, while violent extremist attacks have become too varied in forms to prevent. Out of the need of retaliation and recruitment, the international violent extremist forces have attached more importance to the spread of the violent extremist ideology. The “ISIS” and al-Qaeda have persisted in uploading a huge amount of terrorist video and audio clips to such network platforms as Google Cloud and Youtube, and instant messaging tools to publicize their extreme religious thoughts and violent terrorist techniques. The ringleaders of the “ISIS” have issued several announcements, calling its militants to launch suicide attacks where they are and return to their home countries to wage a Jihad. The ringleader of al-Qaeda Ayman Zawahiri has also called on the branches of al-Qaeda spreading the world over to continue with their attacks against the “heathens” through a video speech. Under such influence, the activities of the international violent extremist forces have entered a new active, expanding and fastigium phase, with the “lone wolf” and “pack of wolves” attacks featuring indigenization and endogeneity multiplying obviously, and such incidents with new means and in new ways as attacking innocent people with knives and trucks, drone bombs and telephone terrorism taking place frequently. It has become prominent that their attacks simplified, their targets diversified and their communication networked, which has made their attacks more concealed, more flexible and more destructive. The threshold of violent extremist activities has been much lowered, with Jihad taking place anywhere and at any time, making it more and more difficult to prevent and fight against violent extremism.

Like many other countries in the world, China is also a victim of terrorism. Currently, the uppermost and most realistic terrorist threat China faces comes from the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), also known as the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP). The ETIM was founded in the 1990s, and was identified by the UN as a terrorist organization on September 11, 2002. Presently, its supreme leader is Abdul Haq, known as Emir by his followers. The ETIM is in close association with al-Qaeda, Taliban of Afghanistan, and the “Jabhat Fateh al-Sham” (JFS) of Syria, currently settling mainly in Syria and Afghanistan. Of late, the ETIM has not only frequently sent people infiltrating into China and launched terrorist attacks on China’s institutions and people stationed overseas, but also communicated and interacted with international and regional extreme terrorist forces. Moreover, the branches of the ETIM in Syria have recruited many terrorists from the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia, while its branches in Afghanistan have also enrolled quite a number of foreign insurgents. At present, the ETIM is developing from a regional terrorist organization with simple structure and a single target to an international terrorist organization with more complicated composition and a larger domain of operation, posing bigger and bigger threat not only to China, but also the international and regional security.
II. The Major Characteristics of the Network Activities by the Violent Extremist Forces of the Day

With the demise of the Caliphate established by the “ISIS” in Iraq and Syria, the violent extremist forces have suffered heavy losses. Aware of the difficulties to reverse the downturn in the real world, the violent extremist forces began to take more active postures in the virtual world, attaching more importance to the strategic significance of the internet to its organizational development. The violent extremist forces have not only seen the network as an important tool for recruitment, fund raising, and publicizing its violent extremist ideology, but also taken it as an important direction for future transformation of its mode of operation, form of organization and development concept. Presently, the internet has become a new battlefield for us to fight against the violent extremist forces, which calls for our close attention and in-depth studies. Currently, the network activities by the violent extremist forces assume the following characteristics:

First, the violent extremist forces have publicized their extremist ideologies and recruit followers through social media and network communication tools. In recent years, the violent extremist forces have instigated relevant people to support or get directly involved in violent terrorist activities by using internet and mobile phone application software. For instance, the international violent extremist organizations have used Facebook to engage in reactionary propaganda, recruitment and sending enciphered messages, among which the high definition brainwashing photos uploaded to Facebook have always been attractive to youth groups of various countries. The perpetrators of the 2015 terrorist attack at the Berlin Christmas Market were those successfully recruited by the “ISIS” through Telegram. Terrorists have also uploaded a huge amount of video clips to Youtube publicizing violent extremism, not only involving extreme religious thoughts and ways to make IEDs, but also showing how to plot and implement terrorist attacks as well as horrible and bloody pictures of decapitating hostages, which feature strong extremist ideology. In addition, the “ISIS” has also developed online games, imbedding violent extremist ideas into the games to brainwash players imperceptibly and attract them into terrorist groups. For example, in the mobile game software developed by the “ISIS”, players can destroy the Big Ben, the Eiffel Tower and the Statue of Liberty, and even revive the scenes of the 9/11 terrorist attack. According to the statistics of the Europol, under the influence of the online extremist ideas, more than 5000 people from Europe have been recruited to fight the Jihad in Iraq and Syria over the past few years, of whom about 1500 have returned to Europe. In 2017 alone, there were 205 terrorist attacks and abortive terrorist attacks occurred in the EU states, a 45 percent growth from 2016, inflicting 68 deaths and 844 injuries, quite a few of which were launched by local terrorists in the “lone wolf” way. The violent extremists have long transmitted messages involving terrorist ideas through internet, social media and cryptographic communication tools, and gradually become radical and violent. The ETIM
uploads hundreds of pieces of audio and video clips involving violent terrorism to internet every year, with captions in Uyghur, Arabic, Russian, Kazakh languages, in an attempt to publicize extremist ideas to people of different nationalities and instigate the terrorists within China to launch terrorist attacks locally, and join the so-called Jihad.

Second, the violent extremist forces have maintained their operation and plotted terrorist activities through social media and internet. Social media and internet have provided the violent extremist groups with covert, safe, convenient and speedy new ways to launch attacks and escape from retaliation. Violent extremists take advantage of the social media and network platforms to coordinate their activities in data collection, liaison, procurement of equipment and operations. The violent extremists who made the shooting at the Lena Night Club in Istanbul at the end of 2016 got their instruction from the “ISIS” through the Telegram software to plot and implement the terrorist attack. With the popularization of the network encryption algorithm, opening “dark nets” by using encryption software and special browser has become the major platform for the violent extremist groups to conduct their on-line activities in recent years. Through these “dark nets”, violent extremists have created a complete chain in the network for teaching violent terrorist techniques, providing violent terrorist materials, conducting violent terrorist operations, reviewing the effects of the operations, and sharing the experiences. Moreover, there are even such network interfaces as “instant helpline” and “feedback compliant mailbox”, no less than the online marketing and service system used by mega businesses. As it is getting more difficult to monitor and supervise the internet finance than the traditional finance, internet has also become the major channel for violent extremists to raise and transfer funds.

Third, the violent extremist forces have attacked key infrastructure through networks. The violent extremist groups have tried to paralyze and undermine the network systems of such key infrastructure as civil aviation, railroad, power and finance through network attacks, by putting in hacker virus as well as rewriting and stealing data, to cause serious incidents and chaos or even to provoke a war.

Fourth, the violent extremist forces have attacked the websites of critical departments through networks. The violent extremist groups have tried to smear the image of a nation and interrupt its service by paralyzing the websites of its key departments, or spreading false and violent extremist information to cause social chaos and panic. For instance, the website of Argentina Army was attacked by alien hackers in June of 2017, when the extremists posted pictures of the “ISIS” and threatening texts in Spanish on its homepage, causing serious social panic. In July the same year, the Foreign Ministry of Brazil was attacked by a malicious email, when the ministry had to disconnect the internet for several hours.
III. Measures to Be Taken by the International Community to Counter the Network Threats by the Violent Extremist Forces

Violent extremism is a common threat to humanity, while it is the common responsibility of the international community to rise up to confront violent extremism. Therefore, countries in the world should strengthen cooperation among them and take the following measures to jointly fight against violent extremism.

First, new technologies should be used to build the situational awareness system of the network threats posed by violent extremism. The widespread use of networks by the violent extremist groups has helped the violent extremist activities infiltrate into every aspect of social life. As a result, an all-dimensional situational awareness system of the network threats posed by violent extremism should be built to effectively identify, track, investigate and control such activities as communication and propaganda by violent extremists by collecting massive network information through various means. Meanwhile, data and information obtained should be put together and comprehensively studied so as to paint a holistic picture of the activities conducted by the violent extremist groups through networks. Currently, some countries have already built the data model (DM) of network activities by the violent extremist groups, which would provide important information support for the departments concerned to accurately master every link of the operational and organizational system of the violent extremist groups from propaganda, recruitment, to planning and issue of orders, and lay the foundation for eliminating these violent extremist forces in the future.

Second, the offense and defense capacity against the network attacks by violent extremists should be raised continuously. To confront the network threats posed by violent extremism calls for building a strong and effective technical shield, and do a good job in blocking the sensitive information and closing down illicit accounts. In 2017, Facebook and Google among others made certain achievements in screening network terrorism-related information, identifying network messages left by the supporters of violent extremism and sorting out the terrorism-related users’ networking. After the outbreak of the WannaCry incident, several countries of the world have raised their alert for the ability of the violent extremist groups to infiltrate the physical space through network attack and responded to these threats by establishing or strengthening the network warfare forces and engaging in self-inspection of network vulnerabilities.

Third, propaganda should be strengthened to eliminate the network influence of violent extremists. Since the violent extremist groups have taken networks as their major vehicle to spread violent terrorist ideas and inflict psychological intimidation, efforts should be made to strengthen online and offline propaganda, innovate methods and means, engage
in psychological intervention, refute extreme arguments, and clean up the infiltration of the violent terrorist ideas. For example, Youtube proposed the “reorientation scheme” in July of 2017, prioritizing in sending video clips involving anti-extremist ideas to users likely influenced by the violent extremist groups like the “ISIS” to restrict the network propaganda and recruitment by the violent extremist groups.

Fourth, efforts should be made to strengthen international cooperation and information sharing, and set up cooperative defense mechanism. The network activities conducted by violent extremists often assume the cross-regional and fluid natures, while their sources usually exist abroad, the participants are of no fixed abode, and the data and information involved are of great complexity. Therefore, ideal results can only be achieved by effective cooperation and coordination between the international community and enterprises to jointly fight against violent extremism.

In the field of inter-governmental cooperation, presently individual countries can no longer manage the terrorism-related issues in network alone through their mechanisms to control and shield the network, and especially curiosity would prompt some young people to do otherwise. Therefore, it is of great importance for the international community to jointly prevent and block terrorism-related information from spreading. So, efforts should be made to establish an inter-governmental technical and legal cooperation mechanism, and unify the international network security standards.

In the domain of cooperation among enterprises, large network enterprises are responsible to provide technical support to the small network corporations with few resources and weak technical conditions to keep them from becoming “vulnerabilities” in the network security protection. At the end of 2016, Facebook, Twitter, Microsoft and Youtube declared they would apply hash algorithm to identify video clips and pictures involving violent extremism, and load them to the shared database, to help network platforms quickly identify and delete terrorismrelated contents.

In the field of cooperation between governments and enterprises, governments of various countries should strengthen data sharing with enterprises, especially the large network enterprises, to effectively unite the technical advantages of the enterprises with the data resource superiority of the governments so as to raise their capacity to counter the network threats posed by violent extremism. In May of 2017, G7 countries signed a joint declaration on counter-terror, announcing that the governments would give more policy and technical support to the network service providers and social media enterprises to increase their protection and striking capacity against the network threats by violent extremism.
Fifth, efforts should be made to further arouse the masses to action so as to build jointly the counter-terror defense line in networks. The governments and enterprises cannot inspect and monitor all the network activities by violent extremists. Therefore, the issue of network threats by violent extremism cannot be solved by governments and enterprises alone. As experiences show, ordinary denizens can help to crack internet hackers and network activities by violent extremists. Mobilizing and relying on every social force is an effective way to counter terrorism in networks. Currently, measures taken by the governments of various countries include: a) Teaching people antiterrorism skills. For instance, developing relevant mobile phone applications, which help people to learn online anti-terrorism courses and basic skills to cope with violent extremist incidents. b) Mobilizing people to report terrorism-related clues to authorities. There are several countries in the world that have introduced policies encouraging people to timely report extreme religious tendencies and actions they discover to the authorities. c) Strengthening mutual trust between the government and the people. Network anti-terrorism calls for well managing the relations between national security and civic rights as well as between security and efficiency. If individual privacy cannot be effectively protected and there are no mutual trust between the government and the people, network antiterrorism will not be understood and supported by the public.

China is a victim of terrorism, but at the same time it is a participant and contributor to the international anti-terrorism cause. China has always supported the UN as the center and to play a leading role in international anti-terrorism cooperation, insisting that all the countries should respect each other and cooperate as equal partners, and opposing “double standard”. China adheres to the concept of addressing both symptoms and root causes, to nip terrorist tendencies in the bud by applying political, economic, social, cultural, diplomatic and military means, and strengthening source control, while stressing on focal points and promoting the resolution of regional hot spots through political means. China insists that terrorism should not be linked to certain countries, nations and religion, promotes communication and dialog among different civilizations, and is trying to create a broader environment conducive to engaging in international anti-terrorism cooperation. In recent years, China’s major approach and experience in countering violent extremism are as follows:

First, China has attached great importance to the role played by the people in fighting against violent extremism. In the age of big data, network activities are so complicated and the flow of information is so huge, that it is very difficult for the government departments to find and effectively prevent the tendencies of network activities by violent extremists. Therefore, the Chinese government has attached great importance to the role played by the people, and tried to raise the awareness of the people to identify and keep watch on the network activities by violent extremists through strengthening education, and increase the enthusiasm of the people to actively report the indications of violent extremist
activities they discover to the authority by setting up tipoff hotlines and reporting incentive mechanism. In this respect, there are two points that call for special attention: a) Education and management cannot be neglected on the people living in remote areas and the marginalized groups. From China’s experiences, remote areas are usually major targets of infiltration by violent extremists, so great attention should be given to these areas so as to find out tendencies of externalization in good time. b) Attention should be given to communication with the Muslim communities. In dealing with the relations with the Muslim communities, the Chinese government has put emphasis on both their specialty and commonality, and encouraged them to get better integrated into the mainstream society.

Second, China has strengthened supervision and management of the extreme religious thoughts on the internet. Religious extremism is the important ideological source that breeds violent extremist activities. Strengthening comprehensive control of religious extremes and restraining the spread of extreme religious ideas have become a consensus for all the countries in carrying out their counter-terror work. In China, especially in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, some of the violent terrorist crimes were committed by those who had downloaded and passed around video clips and books involving religious extremism from the internet. In recent years, relevant departments of the Chinese government have continuously strengthened the identification, monitoring and blocking of the terrorism-related information, especially the video and audio clips involving religious extremism, on the internet, and resolutely cracked down on those violent extremists who instigate and plan violent activities, and engage in arms trafficking on the internet.

Third, China has strengthened inter-departmental cooperation within the government and formed a holistic counter-terror strategy. Fighting against violent extremism concerns every department of the government, which cannot be accomplished by any department alone. China established a coordination mechanism at the state level for counterterror work in 2001 to coordinate the operations of relevant departments. Presently, this mechanism is running smoothly, effectively fusing the power of various departments, while an overall national counter-terror strategy has emerged from their coordinated counter-terror practice.

Fourth, China has attached great importance to eradicating the soil that breeds violent extremism. Violent extremism thrives where people suffer from poverty. As a result, the poor youth groups are easily influenced by extreme religious thought spreading on the internet. Therefore, China has strived to establish a prevention system that is characterized by group prevention and control on the one hand, and on the other hand invested enormous financial and material resources in the poverty-stricken areas to develop their economy, continuously raising the living standard of the people living in these areas so as to prevent terrorism from thriving fundamentally.
Fifth, China has strengthened international cooperation in countering violent extremism. Fighting against violent extremism is the common responsibility of every country of the world, which calls for strengthened international cooperation. Of late, China has boosted its anti-terror measures, fighting against terrorism on both domestic and international fronts. Currently, China has established cooperative mechanism for counter-terror with more than 20 countries in the world, engaging in practical cooperation with them. China has also got deeply involved with the anti-terror task forces of the UN, the SCO and the BRICS and other multilateral cooperation mechanisms like the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, making important contributions to the international fight against terrorism.
“Countering Violent Extremist Narratives in the Global Context.” The significance of this issue was validated three weeks ago when the United Nations convened its inaugural global high-level conference on counter terrorism. In attendance were the heads of Counter Terrorism Agencies of from 149 Member States. This meeting convened with the overall goal of improving international cooperation and information sharing while building new partnerships to find practical solutions. With the rollback of the fight against ISIS in Syria and Iraq the landscape for extremists has changed and the return of fighters to different regions of the world to include Southeast Asia is a very real challenge.

The results of that meeting are a first step to increase our cooperative and coordinated efforts to address this difficult challenge. Our nations’ collaboration in New York and here in the next few days will lay the foundation for our collective efforts to stem the tide of extremist radicalization and violence. The UN work in preventing violent extremism (PVE) and their development of a Plan of Action (POA) to address the underlying conditions that drive individuals to radicalize and join violent extremist groups, is an important step to assist member states in their own strategies, plans and programs. Along with the UN efforts there have been numerous world class research projects and studies completed along with national thought devoted to plans and policies.

However, to date we have not been successful in eradicating those narratives in a global context. An assessment is not an indictment on our efforts or that of the UN. This is a difficult problem—there is no one size fits all solution. Each nation and each region has unique challenges and circumstances yet if we are honest with ourselves, we will concede we must do better.

To challenge our efforts, I want to lay out four, let’s call them “rocks” that seem to weigh us down and prevent us from achieving greater progress despite the knowledge and carefully crafted policy we have today. My hope is that, as we listen to the expert presentations in the next two days, you will keep these “rocks” in mind, and think about ways we can move forward together. If you can think about just one action to complete after this seminar that can help us achieve any of these “rocks,” please do it. Only with our cumulative efforts will we make more progress to address violent extremist narratives.
The first rock is identifying our core objectives in formulating a successful counter narrative. The violent extremist narrative has multiple components and commonality in how it is delivered. The narrative normally has a religious or ideological component that frequently associates effective action with violence and often polarizes the world into two principle camps; a political narrative that places legitimacy in the establishment of a state; a social narrative that makes heroes of the perpetrators; and an economic narrative that addresses personal well-being. All these narratives have one common feature—that violence will achieve the end goal. We must strive to negate these extremist narratives with demonstrated truths and confront the underlying conditions that allow them to take root. Horrendous acts by extremist that are supported by criminal activity and perpetrated against innocent civilians expose the hypocrisy in their message and should be publicized broadly. Socio economic factors such as unemployment, bad governance, lack of education, or government corruption provoke our youth, or others who feel disenfranchised, to seek something else. The extremist narrative that promises a sense of unity and purpose, even if misguided draws some to the perception of a better life. The underlying conditions that allow these ideas to take root must be addressed and governments cannot do this alone. We probably must also confront and address an unpalatable truth—is there something wrong with our own narrative that is making the extremist view of the world attractive to recruits? What is it that recruits reject in our narrative that makes that of the extremists so compelling? How can we compose a stronger narrative, overcoming these weaknesses, and offering a more compelling, unifying story that uplifts and inspires? I’m sure you will recognize this is a very difficult task. But it is an essential one that we must face when we want to reach out and win the ideological fight.

The second rock, how best to convey our counter narrative and to whom. As affirmed by the recent UN High Level Conference, the audience in the majority of cases are our youth, the most crucial segment of our population that we must reach. Our goal is to provide them with a worthwhile sense of life purpose, which requires an inclusive and multifaceted approach involving a whole of society. And we must do this with credibility and legitimacy. Governments cannot and should not take on this task alone. Governments can provide the political will, resources and supportive framework; but for the message to be credible - civil society, religious leaders, the business community, educators and law enforcement are also critical members of this team. We must find collective ways to reduce the risk of crisis in individual lives which in many cases prompt these same folks to accept the distorted versions of truth offered by extremist groups. Key among those we need to address are families and in particular women. We all recognize the fact women hold families together. In my family my mother was always there guiding my development and my wife does the same for my children. Supporting families through education on the detection and prevention of extremist narratives from taking root is essential. Returning fighters may disengage from terrorist activity IF they have the support of their family and a path to
building a more stable future. Ensuring our clergy and educators teach all of us the right path and seeing that their guidance takes hold is equally important. Educating those at risk of adopting extremist narratives in areas such as critical thinking is imperative. Stopping those extremist narratives from taking root in our prison population is necessary to reduce the spread of radicalization, but also to offer hope as a counter narrative for those being released—Hope for a job, an education and a productive life. While there are many policies and programs throughout each of our nations that address components of an effective counter narrative, the level of success and even the metrics used to validate that success are widely debated. Our efforts should focus on agreeing to common metrics to enable us to identify the most productive programs and form a solid basis for best practices. All programs do not need to be the same, but we must agree on what success looks like.

The third rock for your consideration is -how we safeguard our respect for the dignity, human rights and freedoms we all expect as human beings. If we allow fear and diminished freedoms to take root, we will negate any efforts we outline this week and in fact fuel the extremist narrative we are trying to combat. The legitimacy and credibility of governments rest on how secure and stable citizens feel about their leaders, government policy and individual opportunity. Without a doubt, stronger government action, tougher laws, more effective law enforcement and counter measures, more timely and accurate intelligence, all these, and more, will be needed to effectively counter violent extremist narratives. But these must be nested within a broad rule-of-law framework that protects civil liberties, human rights, and due process. Nowadays, ladies and gentlemen, the technologies and capabilities we possess that can be deployed in the struggle against violent extremist narratives are very powerful and potentially intrusive. We must be very careful how we use them and what safeguards we need to place around them. For example, surveillance technologies and cyber tools can be of enormous assistance in countering extremist narratives. But at what cost? Can these tools be mis-used for other purposes? We walk a fine balance here, getting after the bad actors, but also, preserving the rights and liberties of our own citizens so they will continue to trust our governments and security agencies. If we don’t get this balance right, we hand the extremists the upper hand. I would hope therefore, as these technologies proliferate, we share them through cooperation and collaboration. We must also never lose sight of the need to exchange best practices and lessons learned on the rule-of-law context supporting the deployment of these technologies, the safeguards necessary, and the interests of our citizens.

Speaking of cooperation, the fourth rock is how do we deepen and strengthen the cooperation between us? How do we trust each other more? Without cooperation- I predict failure. I propose we develop ways to enhance multilateral cooperation and develop new partnerships. The UN can assist in this regard as can ASEAN, but that is not enough. We can start with establishing relationships here this week and continuing to do so with similar
events held regionally. If we go home without some planned follow on action-we will regret it. We must strengthen our networks and develop actionable goals and objectives that we can track to a successful conclusion. One of those goals is to set up steps to share information in a lawful manner. As an example, the Daniel K. Inouye Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies counter terrorism program has over 1,500 alumni of the nearly 13,000 total alumni. These men and women form a core network we interact with regularly to share information, best practices and collaborative approaches. Our goal is to help security practitioners generate strategic outcomes. In fact a number of the thoughts I offered in these remarks were also discussed in past APCSS workshops by our regional partners.

In summary, The offer is to formulate a core counter narrative; to deliver that narrative in a credible manner; to offer hope to those receiving that message that they will be treated with respect and to increase our cooperation and collaboration that will enable success.
France is the West’s largest supplier of Daesh fighters (Soufan Group 2015: 12). Many attempts have been made to account for what appears to be a “French exception.” William McCants and Christopher Meserole argue for instance that the French laïcité (secularism), and the francophone political culture in general, are a factor conducive to radicalization. The two authors contend that the conjunction of an “aggressive” version of secularism (regulations on conspicuous religious symbols) along with widespread urbanization and mass unemployment provides highly fertile ground for such phenomena to emerge (McCants and Meserole 2016). While stimulating, their research presents a number of biases. First, it encompasses countries whose levels of Francophonie, political cultures and public management of religion greatly differ. Second, upon taking a closer look at statistics, it appears that the ratio of the number of fighters over the total population is smaller in France than in other countries such as Sweden, Switzerland or Denmark. The assertion that there is a “French exception” or a “Francophone exception” is therefore highly questionable.

The high number of French jihadists can probably best be explained by other factors. First, it should be emphasized that France is host to Europe’s largest Muslim population (Pew Research Center 2011). Whilst the share of converts engaged in radical militancy can at times be substantial, it is established that the majority of fighters who joined the Islamic State were raised in Muslim cultural heritage families (practicing or not). Consequently, the potential pool of French candidates to jihad is structurally larger than in most European countries. Another socio-political explanation pertains to what is commonly called “the banlieues [suburbs] predicament.” Although French jihadists display a great diversity of sociological and geographical origins, the bulk of the recruiting ground hails from disadvantaged urban areas (Beckouche 2015). Located at the periphery of most large cities in France, the banlieues are places of social marginalization, where inhabitants are the primary victims of discrimination in access to housing, employment and in their relations to the police (Dubet 1987; Valfort 2015). Socially mixed when they were first built in the 1960s, French banlieues have progressively become ethnicized and ghettoized from the 1980s onwards. In spite of numerous announcements made by political officials, who declare on a regular basis that they want to launch a “Marshall Plan for the banlieues,” public investment has never really met the challenges at hand. In these deprived neighborhoods,
low voter turnouts also contribute to worsen inhabitants’ political marginalization. Such lasting state of affairs has led to a rigidification of identities and to deepen the rift between French people and “banlieue French people.” The situation is further aggravated by the depoliticized interpretation of the urban riots that periodically engulf these areas. Rioters’ demands are often discredited and the state response tends to focus on security issues (Kokoreff 2008). The objective is to end violence rather than identify its deeper roots. As a result, feelings of marginalization have become deeply internalized by social actors, who in turn develop a binary worldview. Such Manichean outlook does not only manifest itself in the religious dichotomy between Muslims and non-Muslims/infidels. It also unfolds in a multitude of binary oppositions that oversimplify the reality: whites/visible minorities; policemen/banlieue youth; rich/poor; Israelis/Palestinians. Such otherization of “them” against “us” creates an environment conducive to breakaway and radical attitudes.

The variety of the Islamic State French fighters’ sociological profiles is a striking fact. Quite evidently, and as illustrated by several studies such as John Horgan’s, the terms “pathways,” “itineraries” and “social trajectories” are best suited to account for the dynamics of commitment (Horgan 2008). The Islamic State has developed well-proven communication strategies to attract a broad spectrum of individuals, be they male or female, hailing from various social backgrounds, and converted or not. In a way, Daesh communication experts have appropriated McDonalds’ famous motto: “come as you are” and the organization will take care of the rest. While identifying definite profiles remains a difficult endeavor, it is nonetheless possible to make an inventory of their general sociological features and clusters of motives. Sociological analyses performed on 265 French jihadists who died in Syria and Irak reveal that 52% hailed from immigration backgrounds and that 56% came from priority neighborhoods. Their average age was 28 and 48% were unfavorably known to the police (delinquency, etc.). The French Coordination Unit of the Fight against Terrorism (Unité de coordination de la lutte anti-terroriste, UCLAT) notes that a large share is made up of youth combining several kinds of difficulties (educational failures, economic hardship, etc.). The interviews I conducted between 2015 and 2016 with fifteen families who were directly affected by a relative’s commitment to Jihadism have enabled me to distinguish six main types of motives. These include humanitarian, religious, political, romantic-marital motives as well as regressive post-feminism and identity quest. It should be emphasized that these various motives are not mutually exclusive and can intersect in a variety of ways. Thus, one candidate can simultaneously be willing to engage in humanitarian work and rescue his “Muslim brothers from Syria” in the name of a Salafi-like religious ideal. Another candidate can define his commitment in highly political terms (anti-imperialist struggle) while being at the same time fascinated by violent action. Beyond such specific motives, as will be demonstrated, the dynamics of enrolment tend to be embedded in precarious social and family backgrounds. The media-friendly word “jihadist,” therefore, encompasses widely disparate realities and refers to actors whose motivations can
be very remote from the official project of restoring the caliphate. Research on this issue has demonstrated that, as soon as 2011, a number of youth went to Syria for humanitarian purposes. Their aim was to rescue Syrian populations who were being bombarded by Bashar Al Assad’s regime in the wake of the Arab Spring’s popular uprisings. The proliferation of online videos displaying civilian casualties at the hands of the Syrian army prompted many young Westerners to converge to the area.

The second issue that plays a central role in fostering this type of commitment relates to politico-religious motives. Many young people went to that region in order to perform jihad, i.e. the holy war against the enemies of Islam, and restore the caliphate. Here, the objective is to bring justice for those Muslim populations who have fallen prey to “crusaders” throughout the world. Such gathering of international combatants willing to fight in the name of their coreligionists is not unprecedented. Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya and even Iraq have all been the theater of jihad operations in the past (Hegghammer 2010). Yet, Daesh stands out because of its fierce determination to reestablish a caliphate by means of weapons. The project of rebuilding a Muslim empire has a powerful appeal to the youth. The idea is to return to the early days of the Muslim empire, a mythical golden age, which is in fact utopian. Scott Atran stresses this point by recalling that the Islamic State’s current success can only be grasped by acknowledging that it is first and foremost an ambitious collective endeavor (Atran 2016). Such collective endeavor contrasts with the inertia of so-called unholy and corrupted Muslim states, which have proven unable, since the collapse of Arab nationalism, to offer a true political vision. Religious motives are also apparent in the desire to perform hijra, i.e. migrating to a Muslim land. Whilst hijra originally refers to the Prophet Muhammad’s migration from Mecca to Medina in order to gain protection from the physical threat posed by wealthy polytheist Arab tribes, the concept has since then been enlarged in some currents of Islam to become a religious duty for all Muslims settled in the West. It should also be underlined that hijra to Syrian-Iraqi lands takes on a specific meaning, for those lands correspond to the Sham, which is a blessed territory from a Qur’anic standpoint. In some interpretations, living and dying in the Sham opens the doors to paradise, not merely for the believer but also for all his loved ones. This motive is clearly expressed by a number of Nice inhabitants who left for jihad after being exposed to the religious indoctrination of ideologue Omar Omsen: “when I met Omar, I realized that as a Muslim, it was my duty to go to this part of the world as an act of solidarity with my Muslim brothers and sisters. I am still in contact with my family in France but I do not wish to return. It is my duty as a Muslim to stay here.”

While their profiles tend to be neglected, some young people also went to Syria with a highly sophisticated geopolitical outlook and firm convictions. These actors are able to articulate a critical reflection on Western powers’ foreign policies in the Middle East (Crettiez, Seze et al. 2017). Like other generations before them, they denounce Western
imperialism, the “double standards” management of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by the international community, as well as the cynicism that shows through the diplomatic relations that Western democracies continue to cultivate with some of the region’s authoritarian regimes (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, etc.). Such massive volunteering is not new in itself and has many historical precedents. From 1936 to 1939, the International Brigades recruited about 35,000 volunteers hailing from 53 different countries to fight in the Spanish civil war (Prezioso, Batou and Rapin 2008). Between 1980 and 1992, roughly 20,000 Muslim combatants (mostly Arabs) entered Afghanistan to counter the Soviet invasion. In the more recent period, it is estimated that, between 1991 and 1995, 500 to 1,000 French nationals joined the various factions involved in the ex-Yugoslavia war. Driven by political and ideological factors, such commitment can also fulfil a sense of adventure. In France, these aspects are often left unaddressed and the government response to radicalization has tended to favor a depoliticized approach. Radical individuals are more often than not apprehended from a pathological standpoint. They are seldom considered as political actors but are rather perceived as extremists or victims of brainwashing and cultish manipulation who require medical treatment. The fact that the issue was framed in terms of mind control has resulted in an inadequate response. In spite of millions of euros invested in the first deradicalization center, its doors closed permanently after only a few months.

The few studies devoted to “female jihad” put forward two types of motives. The first one mostly concerns teenagers and young women, and involves a quest for romance. Indeed, the Islamic State’s cyber recruitment strategies are not restricted to bloody videos. Much less is known about the various media (pictures or videos) showcasing good-looking and wellbuilt male jihadists, whose purpose is to appeal to young Western women so that they perform their hijra. Most of these women encountered personal or family traumas throughout their biographical trajectories. Such is for instance the case of Julie, a 22-year-old French woman of Asian descent. Her mother, who comes from a Parisian banlieue, recounted her journey to me: “my daughter was raped at a very young age and it remained a family secret. (…) Towards the end of her teenage years, she fell in love with a man she had met on social networks and she went to Syria along with her brother. There, she got married. Her husband died very quickly and they offered her to re-marry. There was nothing religious about her; she did not know Islam.” Female Jihadism also takes on more complex meanings. According to Farhad Khosrokhavar, some women’s commitment relates to what he calls regressive postfeminism. He equates such controversial notion with a disenchancing portrayal of the feminist struggle that was led by previous generations. Promoted by often-converted, middle-class women, this post-feminism “glorifies the virile manhood of those who expose themselves to death and who, through that confrontation, prove to be manly, serious and sincere.” By carrying their jihadist project forward, these women seek to recover what contemporary societies do not or no longer offer, i.e. a social world in which male and female roles are strictly codified. In some ways, they willingly swap their
autonomy and independence for a clearly delineated and regulated world that provides them with a sense of psychological security against the anxiety of freedom (Khosrokhavar 2016). Regardless of their actual motives, women hold a doubly strategic role for the Islamic State. Not only do they provide comfort to male fighters but, more importantly, they also ensure the sustainability of the caliphal project by giving birth to a future generation of combatants, the “caliphate’s lion cubs.”

Finally, a significant share of jihadists are looking for a sense of identity and self worth. I now turn to this segment of combatants. Khosrokhavar has already highlighted the strong recurrence among candidates to jihad of fatherless family backgrounds – which are “beheaded,” as he puts it. The search for meaning certainly relates to identity and affective issues (oftentimes both) but does not exclude fascination with action and violence. A recent documentary film depicting young French jihadists enlisted by Omar Omsen is particularly illuminating in that respect. The interactions between the propagandist and his young draftees closely resemble those that are commonly taking place in educational centers. Among this youth, the lack of identity or family markers is often combined with narcissistic tendencies. The jihadist commitment project is precisely designed to fill those affective and egotist shortcomings. Enrolling in the jihadist struggle on Syrian-Iraqi lands provides young Westerners with an opportunity for both positive identification and collective exaltation. By bringing them together under the cosmopolitan “foreign fighters” battle flag, it lifts them out of their condition as “Western banlieues losers” and grants them the much more gratifying status of “God’s fighters in the East.” The caliphal project fully transforms the individual, by instantly turning passive bystanders located at the periphery of the system into actors who actively built a system, in this case the caliphate. Such project is all the more exciting because it also satisfies a desire for action and adrenaline. The war capital and virile manhood highlighted in Daesh’s propaganda videos are significant pull factors for some young people. Such was the case of Antoine, a former student in the city of Toulouse who eventually left for Syria. His mother stated in her interview that “he could spend entire nights on the Internet playing combat games and looking at propaganda videos by the Islamic State. His life was driven by fighting sports and appetite for action. He didn’t know much about Middle-Eastern geopolitics. He fought and died there.” Lying behind the homogenizing word of “jihadist,” there is therefore a multiplicity of highly heterogeneous realities. The term conflates a range of actors whose motivations greatly vary but who all believe that the Islamic State project can meet their desires, needs and identity and affective flaws.
Regional Trends of Violent Extremism

It is important to first recognise or be cognizant that the threat of extremism is not unique to any country, region or even religion.

Looking at the trends in Southeast Asia, the threats of terrorism attacks and planned attacks on home ground continues to cause concerns to effected countries and even those countries whom do not received direct threats are not immune from its indirect threats.

In the globally networked community of today, the threat on the spread of extremist ideology and propaganda multiplies with the advancement of communication technology and the Internet. The social media such as Facebook and Telegram provides another platform to rapidly spread influence and gain sympathisers as well as supporters to their cause. The online mass media remains the preferred medium for recruitment and the profile of terrorist changing with family recruitments and increasing role of women in leading or planning attacks as seen with recent attacks in the region.

Brunei’s Environment and Approach

As other countries in the region, Brunei strongly condemns terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and rejects extremism and radicalism. In this regard, Brunei also support efforts of the international community to prevent and eliminate all forms of terrorism, particularly the various related international conventions and United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions, including Resolution 2170 (2014) calling on the international community to prevent terrorist groups from posing any threats to peace and security.

Brunei have not experienced direct terrorist threats from attacks or planned attacks as other countries. However, as other countries in the region, Brunei is vulnerable to being used as transit points and to the potential risks of terrorism financing. It is also certainly not immune from radicalisation.

As a majority Muslim population representing 78.8% out of a total of 431,400 people in the country, the potential risks of radicalisation of Muslims away from the Islamic faith
and teachings in accordance to is a concern that directly relates to the peace and stability in the country. It has a large young population of ages 25 to 54 years coupled with the highest internet penetration of 95 percent and equally 95 percent active users of social media, thus the country’s online radicalisation including self-online radicalisation is high. As such, it becomes more important for Brunei to enhance awareness and better equip the community with cyber knowledge. At the national level, there is heavy emphasis on preventive measures to ensure peace and stability in the country. Similar with other countries, Brunei has taken a comprehensive whole of government and nation approach. Brunei place importance on inter-agency coordination and cooperation in which relevant agencies work close under the National Security Committee. Various legal instruments and frameworks are in place at domestic and international levels covering all aspects to address terrorism and violent extremism.

In the era of social media technologies, there is an increased recognition on the need to refocus on counter radicalisation strategies including approaches in countering violent extremist narratives, that fits with the nation’s social and cultural context.

The authority on religious affairs lies with the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Brunei Islamic Council and State Mufti Department. These institutions are responsible to uphold and defend the Islamic faith and teachings in accordance to Ahli Sunnah Wal Jamaah of Mazhab Syafi’i that is embedded in the Brunei’s Constitution 1959 Chap 3 (1). The centralisation of religious authority ensures standardization and consistency of knowledge, including through standardised Friday sermons, standardised curriculum of religious education, screening of religious preachers (to ensure that they are adequately qualified).

Today’s online accessibility of information through social media and Internet poses a huge challenge to counter religious practices from uncertain sources of information and reading materials. Brunei’s small population and its social fabric of close-knit families and community provides a unique environment that supports the country’s preventive strategies. The community is sensitive to religious activities that may not be consistent with the Islamic faith and teachings that Bruneians practice. More often than not, the public plays an important proactive role to alert any suspicious activities to the authorities’ attention as both preventive and enforcement measures.

There are also close relations between the government machinery responsible for religious affairs, and the public. Religious outreach has been in practice since the 1950s and over decades, the Pusat Da’awah Islamiah (a religious institution within the Ministry of Religious Affairs responsible to ensure correct teachings of Islam in the country) has built strong relations with the community. Dialogues and consultations are carried out through face-to-face contacts and interviews; an online platform as well as hotlines are provided to the public as early interventions to counter any elements of deviant practices and beliefs to
Ahli Sunnah Wal Jamaah. Scholars exposed to various different strands of Islamic knowledge and jurisprudence are at hand for the purposes of scholarly discussions. All this is important to ensure any interpretation against the Islamic faith and teachings in Brunei are addressed and extremist influence are mitigated.

Further to this, education and awareness centered among the youth is key in Brunei’s preventive measures. Through strong religious and formal education foundation and various community outreach programmes, it aims to instill values promoting a balanced way of life based on universally accepted values to ensure justice, harmony, respect of differences and help one another. The Program Khidmat Bakti Negara (PKBN), which is a non-conscript national service programme for 16 to 21-year-olds, contributes to enhancing patriotism, building resilience and strengthening their understanding of the nation.

**Importance of Strengthening Regional Cooperation**

Along with its national approach, Brunei attaches high importance to working with neighbours and friends through bilateral as well as regional and international cooperation in addressing security challenges. While countering terrorism and radicalisation lies primarily with other relevant ministries, the Ministry of Defence contributes through the various Intelligence and Information Sharing exchanges bilaterally and multilaterally. The Royal Brunei Armed Forces plays a supporting role in countering any security threats against Brunei.

At the regional level, ASEAN has given the highest level of commitment and support in addressing the evolving security threats posed by terrorism and violent extremism through its various cooperative platforms under the ASEAN ministerial meetings of defence, transnational crimes and telecommunications and information sectors as well as the ASEAN Regional Forum and East Asia Summit. In addition to that, ASEAN Leaders Statement on Cybersecurity cooperation further reflects the recognition on the urgent need to further advance cooperation in a comprehensive manner.

Countering violent extremist narratives in the world of technology requires a much more a broader stakeholder engagement through existing platforms. In this regard, interactions and exchanges at various levels, including at policy and operational levels, between law enforcement and security agencies, as well as between different stakeholders to cyber security, is needed to understand the various challenges and share best practices, as well as consider cooperative solutions.

In parallel, similar efforts among the relevant stakeholders related to terrorism and extremism in the region could be explored. The Track 2 could also play a role in providing a deeper perspective with regard to the overall approaches that are being taken by the different sectors in addressing terrorism and extremism.
Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) in Indonesia Perspective

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Republic of Indonesia

Introduction

Indonesia as a multicultural country has various types of threat due to the diversity of its society. The differences among societies may determine the different value, goals and also beliefs that may contradict for certain individuals or groups. Thus, the emergence of violent extremist may possibly happened to impose their thoughts or beliefs to the others.

The violent extremist threat, which is also related to the terrorism, comes from a range of individuals and groups, for instance the international terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS. The local offenders or small groups may be radicalized to commit extreme violence at their environment or even attempt to travel abroad to become foreign fighters. Surely, the uses of social media, internet and hatred news are the powerful tools to begin the recruitment and radicalization of individuals and raising the group members.

The program of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) is a proper choice against the irresponsible person in spreading the extreme ideology. Frazer and Nunlist (2015) explained that the violent extremism is no longer associated only with individuals terrorist attacks, but also with conflicts that have caused tens of thousands of deaths and injuries, thus CVE fosters closer cooperation and exchange between the security services and actors in the fields or conflict management and prevention. The violent extremists should be fought through the smart and strategic way, for instance, by tackling the structural cause of violent extremism including the intolerance act, government fraud and failure, political issues, economic factors and social marginalization.

Moreover, in Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), it is necessary to engage with relevant local communities, professionals and non-governmental actors in developing strategies to counter the violent extremist narrative that can promote the terrorist acts attempts. The states around the world are also called upon to address the conditions in preventing the spread of violent extremism; the efforts are realized through empowering youth, families, women, men, religious, cultural and education leaders, and all other concerned groups of civil society, and also promoting the idea of living in harmony among diversity.
Meanwhile, from 2000 until 2015 it was noted that more than 250 cases of terrorism act happened in Indonesia. The casualties were also many, the counts reached 360 fatalities.

![Figure 1. The Data of Terrorist Attack in 2010 – 2015](source)

There were so many law enforcement attempts by the police to stop the terror. For instance, in 2002 up until now, more than 1050 terrorist criminal were caught and shot dead. However, it was not necessary made the terrorism threat stopped. In March 2011, there was a case related a “Book-Bomb” and followed by a suicide bomber at Cirebon in April 2011. A month after these terrors, a policeman was shot in Palu. Later, in June 2011, a policeman was also shot dead in Bima. In July 2011, a bomb also exploded in one of the Islamic Boarding School, Bima. In September 2011, there was a suicide bomber exploded in the Church, Solo. In addition, since 2014 the trend of “Syria Jihad” was popular among the extremist in Indonesia. Most of the extremist went to Syria with the intention for Jihad. From 2013 to 2015, it was estimated that 348 people from Indonesia heading to Syria. Most of these Indonesian joint ISIS with their value “the end-time war” against the evil. In January to November 2015, around 148 people were deported to Indonesia by the Turkish Government.

Although the diagram provided a reduction in 2013 to 2015, however, in 2018, the sequences of exploded bomb were happened in some Churches, police station, Surabaya.
Based on the explanation above, this research proposes a Countering Violent Extremism effort in Indonesia Perspective. These conditions made the Countering Violent Extremism important to be applied in the entire environment, especially among the society. Various initiatives have been established by Indonesian state agencies and civil society organizations in recent years, however there should be more effort to make it largely affected the extremists. While there are signs that stakeholders are willing to collaborate and share best practices, the national counterterrorism agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, BNPT) may be more effective if it assumed the coordinating role it was originally mandated to occupy. Instead the BNPT has initiated its own CVE programs, which many observers perceive to be top-down, fragmented and lacking consistent commitment. Civil society organizations, meanwhile, have strong grass-roots networks, hands-on experience, and the legitimacy required to engage individuals with subversive conviction (Sumpter, 2017).

Conceptual Frameworks

Classifying Drivers of VE

When researching the causes of VE it is beneficial to draw on systems of classification of such drivers, as this helps to ensure that potential contributory factors are noticed. It is USAID does not aim to offer a definitive list of potential drivers, but as examples of push factors it mentions social marginalization and fragmentation, poorly governed or ungoverned areas, government repression and human rights violations, endemic corruption and elite impunity, and cultural threat perceptions. Pull factors are said to include access to material incentives, social status, adventure, self-esteem, personal empowerment and a sense of belonging, as well as “the presence of radical institutions or venues, service provision by extremist groups, and extremist involvement in illegal economic activity. (USAID, 2011).

While USAID proposed the push and pull factors, Khalil, J. and Zeuthen, M. (2016) adapted the following adaptation to this existing typology:

► **Structural motivators.** These include repression, corruption, unemployment, inequality, discrimination, a history of hostility between identity groups, external state interventions in the affairs of other nations, and so on.

► **Individual incentives.** These include a sense of purpose (generated through acting in accordance with perceived ideological tenets), adventure, belonging, acceptance, status, material enticements, fear of repercussions by VE entities, expected rewards in the afterlife, and so on.
Enabling factors. These include the presence of radical mentors (including religious leaders and individuals from social networks, among others), access to radical online communities, social networks with VE associations, access to weaponry or other relevant items, a comparative lack of state presence, an absence of familial support, and so on.

Moreover, Khalil, J. and Zeuthen, M. (2016) added that structural motivators (which are largely equivalent to the push factors described by USAID) tend to provide substantial explanatory power for the existence of attitudes that are supportive of the purported aims of VE. However, there is a strong argument that such drivers poorly explain behaviors that directly contribute to this violence on the basis that „rational actors who support its purported objectives would logically elect to „free-ride on the efforts of others, and thus avoid the potential costs associated with participation, such as imprisonment, injury and death. Drivers from the second category (which incorporates many USAID pull factors), including adventure, status, material enticements, fear and so on, overcome the free-rider hurdle through offering incentives that are contingent on actual participation. To avoid some of the confusion associated with the USAID system, the third category (which also includes many USAID pull factors) is distinguished from the previous two by comprising factors that enable VE, rather than motivate it.

Rational Choice Theory

Based on the rational choice theory, an individual decides whether or not to participate in an act of violent extremism or even terrorism on the basis of a cost benefit analysis. The benefits of participation are weighed to the costs associated with participation. If the benefits are greater than the costs, then the individual decides to participate. Within a group setting, „the benefits of success and group participation itself are often defined generally as selective incentives, or personal goods reaped only from participation in the movement, (Olson 1965 as cited by Eager, 2008) and collective or public goods, or goods that can be shared by the entire group including individuals who did not participate (Moore 1995, 424; Muller and Opp 1986 as cited by Eager, 2008).

In the case of violent extremist movements, the reward for success (the overthrow of the current regime) is a public good, available to all individuals regardless of whether or not they participated in the act itself. This description suggests that the theory relies on a number of assumptions: that is, humans are self-interested and make choices to suit their desired ends with minimal personal or material cost. However, a theoretical flaw arises when group behavior is compared to individual choice. The rewards for collective action are present for everyone with an interest and individual participation is not a necessary prerequisite for receipt of the benefits. Eager (2008) argues that individuals recognize that
their individual contribution to the group will not significantly increase the group’s chances of success, and the likelihood of a group succeeding may serve as a disincentive for individuals not to participate (Eager 2008). Thus, either way, the individual who chooses to avoid all costs by participating in the act will still benefit from the outcome, hence becoming a „free rider.

Psychological Theories

Psychological theories of violent extremism are primarily concerned with understanding and group factors contribute to radicalization and acts of terror. The main area of focus in the discipline and research on the psychological theories of terrorists is the mental functioning and personality of the individuals. Authors of this field are not necessarily psychologists or psychiatrists by profession but rather draw their conclusions on psychological responses to sociological influences or the result of individual mental illness and/or trauma (Brynjar and Katja 2005).

Further, psychological profiling attempts have failed to provide a consistent “terrorist profile” (Al-Lami, 2009). Even looking at only “jihadist” terrorism there is considerable diversity: some are well-off financially while others are poor; some are highly educated and others not; some are well-integrated and others live in the margins of society; some are single and others are married; some have traumatic childhoods and some come from loving, stable families; some have criminal records and others are law-abiding up until the terrorist attack. About the only thing “jihadi” terrorists have in common is that they appear to be exceedingly “normal” under most measures (Al-Lami, 2009). Viewing that individuals scoring poorly on socioeconomic variables are at risk of radicalization or violence. It stems from the belief that poor socioeconomic performance (i.e. poverty, unemployment and underemployment, low educational attainment) leads to frustration, which makes them susceptible to radicalization (Al-Lami, 2009).

Simple socioeconomic explanations of radicalization are unable to account for this variety. The problem is that this theory presumes that terrorism is instrumentalist and financially motivated. It is assumed that the other factors such as perception of discrimination and also concerning Western government’s foreign policy with regard to Muslim countries and peoples can be triggers of frustration that lead to radicalization, irrespective of economic conditions.
Radicalization

Veldhuis and Staun (2009) define radicalization as “the active pursuit or acceptance of far-reaching changes in society, which may or may not constitute a danger to democracy and may or may not involve the threat of or use of violence to attain the stated goal”. Normally, the definitions of radicalization stress difference from societal norms. It can be stated that radicalization is the changing process into extreme perspective towards the certain situation. Thus, the radicalization which is followed by the extreme idea or thought might lead to the violent acts. The literature implies that we know someone is radicalized because they have radical ideas and therefore are radicals.

About the only thing that radicalization experts agree on is that radicalization is a process (Al-Lami, 2009). In fact, several authors point out that radicalization does not necessarily follow a linear path, with some people drifting in and out of radical and more moderate groups (Al-Lami, 2009). To a large degree, CVE policy has kept pace with an expanded understanding of how and why individuals become involved in extremist violence. Over the past ten years, significant social science research has advanced a sophisticated analytic framework of the dynamics of radicalization. This research has led past simplistic explanations for terrorism, and we now understand radicalization as a fluid, nonlinear, highly individualized process (see figure 1).

![Figure 2. Dynamics of Radicalization](image-url)
Sageman, M (2008) explained the process reflects the interplay of drivers on several levels:

- push factors that include structural conditions, such as poverty, and grievances, such as lack of access to political processes or justice;

- individual psychological and emotional characteristics, such as need for belonging, dignity, meaning, or revenge, or the continuation of cycles of violence brought on by chronic conflict;

- the influence of socialization and group dynamics by family, peers, and schools; and

- the pull of active recruitment to include extremist messaging that inspires violence.

What leads a young man in northern Nigeria to join Boko Haram or a teenager in Kyrgyzstan to spend time with Hiz but-Tahrir are unique and highly contextual set of circumstances, grievances, and issues. And though these stories, pathways, or trajectories toward extremist violence can be carefully analyzed and understood in retrospect, no models of radicalization are predictive (Atran, S, 2010). There is no way to determine whether an individual in certain circumstances, with a certain disposition, with certain relationships, and exposed to certain ideas will end up engaged in violence. It is only possible to gauge vulnerability to this likelihood. Although the radicalization process is highly contextual, many of the push factors that relate to an individuals internal traits and psychological motivations can be universally understood (McCauley, C.R and Moskalenko, S., 2011). Sageman, M and others have identified common social-psychological motivations for participating in terrorist groups and movements, such as a need for belonging and validation (Post, J.M., 2008).

Others have pointed to emotional drivers, such as a desire for revenge and responses to perceived humiliation, especially in the case of suicide attacks (Stern, J., 2003). A sense of thrill seeking and adventure also can play a part in pushing others toward engagement in violence (Venhaus, J., 2010). It can be stated that, understanding the dynamics of radicalization requires an appreciation for human psychology. CVE practice has expanded to include a spectrum of interventions that range from working to counter the narrative of terrorist recruitment messaging to development projects designed to mitigate the more structural causes that make an individual vulnerable to recruitment. CVE can now be best characterized as a rapidly growing and evolving international community of practice. However, the translation of CVE policy, as currently conceptualized, into effective practice continues to face several significant interrelated challenges (Holmer, G., 2013).
Network-based CEWERS

Conflict Early Warning and Response System (CEWERS) is a concept which illustrate various activities to conflict prevention. The assumption in CEWERS concept is usually refer to the analogy that conflict as a cycle, which are, conflict prevention step, intervention to stop violence (peacekeeping), negotiation to create peace (peacemaking) and also the effort to develop peace in order establish long-term resilience (ITP, 2005). Based on the book entitled “Mari Mencegah Konflik” created by Institut Titian Perdamaian (ITP) 2005, in general, there are three main activities that should be done for CEWERS. First, creating a conflict background analysis or conflict background report. This step refers to the analyzing of components and process that establish a conflict and peace in the past. Second, creating analysis about current conflict which product is called as the current condition. The aim of this step is to analyze the contribution of each component and process that establish past conflict and peace in supporting the current conflict and peace. The last step is the combination of the first and second step, which is called as CEWERS Report.

In order to gain deeper understanding, the picture below illustrates the CEWERS activities:

![Figure 3. The Framework of CEWERS Activities](source: ITP, 2005)
In order to create good CEWERS Report, the creating process should be developed by using network-based. Network is the source of information as well as the arena for idea and action exchange in order to prevent the conflict (ITP, 2005). The chosen stakeholders will become the member of this network. FGD (Focus Group Discussion) will become the tool for CEWERS practitioners together with the chosen stakeholders to analyze conflict and peace establishment scenario. Thus, the CEWE activities are the activities that is conducted by, from and for the community network themselves as the stakeholders (ITP, 2005).

![Network-Based CEWERS Diagram](source/image)

*Figure 4. The Activities of Network-Based CEWERS*

*Source: ITP, 2005*

There are steps in designing the conflict background, first, composing objective of CEWERS in a specific form. Second, creating conflict chronological narratives in the past (concerning important phase from the escalation by 5W1H Method). Third, doing SAT analysis (Structure, Accelerator, Trigger) by defining significant components in the phase of escalation and de-escalation. Fourth, mapping the important process in the chronological narratives through securitization analysis, which includes “conflict building” and “peacebuilding”.

The analysis of SAT aims to reframing data which is obtained from 5W1H analysis, especially in the part of “What” and “Why”. SAT is realized as objective facts affecting the dynamic of conflict escalation and de-escalation. Structural Factor is also considered as the background which creating pre condition of conflict. For instance, economic disparities,
political exclusion, etc. This structural indicator components are used to judge the risk of latent conflict. Accelerator Factor is the events that contribute to the conflict escalation or even de-escalation. While Trigger Factor is the events that trigger the conflict to be happened.

**The Education of “Defend the Country” (Bela Negara)**

The programme of “Defend the Country”, it is usually called as “Bela Negara”, is one of the programme led by The Defense Ministry of The Republic of Indonesia. This programme is basically aimed at the citizen attitudes and behavior to increase their sense of belonging and great interest to their own country, Indonesia. As the Article 27, verse 3 UUD 1945 stated that, “Every citizen entitled and required to be participated in the effort of defense and national security”. This article should be a guide for the citizen obligations which are concerning about national defense and security.

The citizen participation in the effort of defend the country are realized through civic education, basic military training on a mandatory basis, joining Indonesia Army and serving based on their profession. In the Doctrine of State Defense as stated in the Defense Ministry Regulation, No. 24 in 2004, there are 5 (five) base attitudes of Bela Negara, loving the country to defend The Republic of Indonesia, awareness of nation and state in the diversity, convincing Pancasila as the ideal basis and the 1945 Constitution as the constitutional foundation, willing to sacrifice for the sake of the nation and having the early ability of defending states that include both psychic and physical abilities.

**Results and Discussion**

**Society perception towards VE**

One of the researches that have conducted in Indonesia Defense University was “Countering Violent Extremism through Society Empowerment in Sukoharjo District, Central Java”. Since this Violent Extremism is the threat for the integrity and the existence of Indonesia, the research was aimed to catch society perception towards VE, the CVE Program that has been done by the government and society and the relation between the attitude and behavior of “Defend the Country” with the CVE effort.

Concerning the bomb tragedy happened in Surabaya previous weeks ago, Violent Extremism rate in Solo, Central Java was quite high. VE could not be separated from the hidden agenda of certain international group. The youth, especially, were the vulnerable group that got easily influenced by the radical ideology. The extremism was easily developed due to the differences among the society which declared their own correctness and considered the others wrong or misguided. The terror happened in Indonesia had relations
with the tragedy happened in several places before. Therefore, the push factors and pull factors played important role for someone joining the extremism act. For instance, the rebels tragedy by the terrorist criminal happened in the police headquarter Jakarta was followed by several exploded bomb tragedy happened in Surabaya. The push factor could be identified as the motivation for the bomber to have revenge or continuing the spirit of “jihad” over the tragedy in Jakarta. While the pull factor could be identified as the advantages or motives for the bomber to do so, such as the extremist message for “jihad” meaning “fight in the way of Allah, cleaning the polytheism” that was mistranslated by killing the others.

The society perception, later, brought the negative impact to the Islamic Boarding School (Pondok Pesantren) due to the alumni involvement into the act of terrorist. Although the Islamic Boarding School could not be blamed for the act of its alumni, still, the society perception was made by stereotype and assumptions from many sources, especially media. However, the radical mind in Indonesia developed due to the lack of national integrity, for example corruption, legal imbalance and welfare issue. As the result, the extremist or the radical people tend to think in realizing the correct doctrine, one of them is Islamic Law.

One of the Islamic Boarding Schools did not agree with the act of terrorism, killing the police officer and others. Most of the Islamic Boarding Schools were in moderate stance. It was proven from their participation in celebrating the Independence Day of Indonesia. This act was one of the realizations of nationalism that has been taught in the Islamic Boarding School. Another important value was the way implementing Islam as the motor in practicing Pancasila in order to face corruption and injustice. By doing so, the Muslims felt the implementation of Islamic Law. The act of radical movement did not reflect the lesson from Islam. Most of “Ustad” (Teacher in Islamic Boarding School) stated that no one agreed with the act of violent extremism, especially terrorism. Moreover, the role of media in spreading the information related to the terrorism made the society thought that Islamic Boarding School became the sources of terrorist.

CVE Efforts by the Government

The integrated program for CVE should be conducted by the ministries or other institutions. The synergy from the elements of society and government are needed to establish social cohesion to prevent radical ideology among the society. The government, through their Educational Institution, may implement the accommodative leadership. One of the examples was Eleventh March University (“Universitas Sebelas Maret”) Surakarta. The rector of UNS Surakarta implemented the accommodative leadership pattern. He built the 6 places of worship for his students accommodating 6 religions in Indonesia. This aimed to improve the tolerance and respect for the diversity among the students in the University.
The Education of “Defend the Country” or Bela Negara is also one of the governments efforts in CVE. However, one of the teachers in SMA Al-Azhar 7 Sukoharjo stated that this program was not well socialized among the students and teachers. The socialization of this program and its implementation among the schools should be more frequent. This might be possibly done by doing cooperation with the local government and the educational institution. Moreover, the support from the Indonesian Army in the region could be a good advantage in spreading the program of Bela Negara. This program also includes the civic education curriculum which thought the value of diversity, The 1945 Constitution and Pancasila. In addition, the fund for the program should also be available in order to support the implementation well.

**CVE Efforts by the Society**

The society of Solo has their own local wisdom in preventing the violent extremism or radical ideology among their social environment. The existence of rich social capital in their society, for instance politeness, respecting each other, friendly, mutual cooperation among society strengthen the social cohesion to prevent radical ideology intercepting the society. The CVE program should be well socialized to the society, one of the examples was done by Ngruki Islamic Boarding School. This school established the good relationship with the society among them. Moreover, the school held social services for the society. Another example was from SMA Al-Azhar 7 Sukohajo by implementing Character and Spiritual Building which directing students to positive activities. This program also allowed teacher to monitor students from WA Group and doing consultation with the home-room teacher. More important thing was the lesson for the religion value, morals to prevent students from violent extremism.

In CVE Program, the preventing effort was also done by community empowerment. In increasing the community resilience, UNS Surakarta established Balai Kerjasama Polisi Masyarakat dan Mahasiswa (BKPMM) or a place for cooperation between Society Police and college student. This institution facilitated the dialog between communities, college student, police officer and gathered for several times in a month. There was also evaluation conducted each semester with the community in analyzing and detecting the suspected condition.

Another form of CVE Program by the society was “Empowering Program”. This program was aimed to encourage student participation in helping poor family by living in the middle of their condition in order to grow the empathy and social awareness. Then, “Enabling Program” was related to the daily social services. Regarding “Defend the Country” Education Program, this program was also aimed as CVE program. One of the models was conducted in UNS which were the lesson about Civic Education and Pancasila.
Besides, the college student should follow flag ceremony and this “Bela Negara” value implemented through Students Regiment (Resimen Mahasiswa).

The existence of the photos of The President and The Vice President of Indonesia and the Garuda as the symbol of Indonesia in the Islamic Boarding School were considered as nationalism sense among the Islamic School. Moreover, there were also some activities related “Bela Negara” Program in one of the high school in Sukoharjo, first, “Gerakan Cinta Tanah Air” which implemented through weekly flag ceremony, Boy Scout as compulsory extra curriculum, social service for empathy and social awareness. Second, “Sadar Berbangsa dan Bernegara” which included into the importance of nationalism and the consciousness for state and nation. Third, “Yakin kepada Pancasila” which meant to convince the value of Pancasila and the understanding of 1945 Constitution in order to comprehend the diversity through Civic Education.

“Bela Negara” and State Defense in Countering Violent Extremism

In the context of CVE, it is related to the Defense Science, especially in Peace and Conflict Resolution Study. The relation between threat and state defense as stated in Constitution No. 3 in 2002 about State Defense that “State Defense is all the effort in defending the sovereignty of the state, the integration of territory and the safety of the citizen from the threat outside the country. In the General Defense Policy of the Year 2015-2019 stipulated by Presidential Regulation No. 97 of 2015 explained that the nature of state defense is all universal defense efforts, whose operation is based on awareness of the rights and obligations of citizens and confidence in their own strength. State defense is based on the principles of democracy, human rights, public welfare, the environment, the provisions of national law, international law, international customs, and the principle of peaceful coexistence by considering the geographical conditions of Indonesia as an archipelagic country and maritime state.

Countering-Violent-Extremism (CVE) paired with the nature of state defense, it has 2 (two) emphases on awareness of citizens’ rights and duties also the confidence in their own strengths. The belief in its own power implies that efforts or Countering-Violent-Extremism are excavated based on the powers that exist within the Indonesian nation, in this case society as the largest part of the nation. Communities need to be empowered so that they have resilience against Violent-Extremism threats. Meanwhile, awareness of the rights and obligations of citizens refer to the formulation of the rights and obligations of citizens under the constitution, the 1945 Constitution.
Violent Extremism and Countering Violent Extremism

Bjørgo (2005) mentions, there are no single roots of terrorism, or even a set of causes, but there are preconditions and precipitations of various forms of terrorism. Terrorism in the long run is set in Prerequisites. They are relatively general and structural, producing a wide range of social outcomes where terrorism is just one of them. Prerequisites alone are not enough to cause terrorism. The originator is much more directly affected the rise of terrorism. This is a particular event or situation that directly proceeds, motivates or triggers the outbreak of terrorism. Some things as prerequisites and triggers are described below. First, the lack of democracy, civil liberties and the rule of law are a prerequisite for various forms of domestic terrorism. Second, the failure or weakness of the state in controlling the violence. Third, rapid modernization in the form of high economic growth has also been found to be strongly correlated with the rise of ideological terrorism, but not with ethno-nationalist terrorism. When traditional norms and social patterns are collapse or irrelevant, new radical ideologies may become attractive to certain segments of society. Fourth, either religious or religious-based extremist ideologies can at least be the intermediate cause of terrorism, although people usually adopt extremist ideologies as a consequence of fundamental political or personal reasons.

According to a study form USAID (2009b), it has identified the driving factors of the rise of violent extremism, namely the denial of basic political rights and civil rights, human rights violations and government repression, rampant corruption, impunity enjoyed by the elite, bad governance, protracted violent conflicts and illegitimate government. These environmental or structural conditions are push factors that force a person to support violent extremism. Research conducted by USAID (2009b) has also highlighted the pulling factor that makes the ideas of violent extremist groups and groups attractive. Among these factors are the social networks and personal relationships, material gains, and social gains from joining extremist groups using charismatic leaders and leaders and interesting ideas and interests.

Analysis

Counter-Terrorism and radicalism that have been done, less likely to pay the attention in prevention aspects that can be done on these vulnerable communities. The approach used was more on the reactive aspects with the use of force (Hard Power), either after the occurrence of terror attacks or after the existence of individuals from vulnerable communities who have become radical. The use of Hard Power by Densus 88 and BNPT, were not considered optimal and even counterproductive. The counterproductive was in the level of trust of some people. For example, due to the mistake in capturing criminals, mis-shot, misinformation, the community lost their trust to these institution. This subsequent
mistrust could easily spread through social networks and social media. In addition, the examples from the US in Iraq and Afghanistan, which were reactively trying to attack with military force against places that were considered to be a hotbed of terrorists. What has happened showed the limits of the use of Hard Power, in overcoming the problems of terrorism and radicalism.

![Diagram showing the relationship between Hard Power, Smart Power, and Soft Power in the context of community engagement strategies.](image)

**Figure 5.** Bela Negara (Defend the Country) as one of the Smart Power & Community Engagement Strategies owned by Indonesia in facing Terrorism and Radicalism.

The Smart Power-based strategy is needed to overcome the problem of terrorism and radicalism in Indonesia. Ways that can be used for example is with Community Engagement Strategies which is a combination of Smart Power accompanied synergy cooperation of the government and society in overcoming the problem of terrorism and radicalism (Figure 5). In Indonesia, the State Defense Program can be considered as a form of Community Engagement Strategies. Due to the increasing love of the homeland, willing to sacrifice for the sake of the nation and state, etc. The society is considered to be able to have a higher Social Resilience and able to perform and apply CVE independently to radical ideology and views that are not in accordance with the spirit of Bela Negara.
Frequently, terrorism has its roots in economic, political, social and cultural factors mixed with each other, which are then justified by literal and rigorous interpretation of religion; or even deliberately misleading—which is inconsistent with the interpretations agreed upon by authoritative and recognized religious interpreters. The existence of discrimination and the imposition of religion, including the abolition of Islamic law in the past, became the structural root of separatist and terrorist movements. The counterterrorism and separatism should be multi-facetted, multi-track and comprehensive. The military and security response will not be able to handle terrorism. On the contrary, it can be counterproductive and create excesses that can create a difficult “circle of terrorism” to end.

Conclusion

Based on the explanation before, there are several conclusions that can be stated in this paper as the guide for the government:

a. The importance to improve the community awareness regarding CVE through “Bela Negara” program.

b. Conducting intensive discussion between the community and the government elements in order to gain trust through CEWERS Framework.

c. Doing social approach to the community by conducting empowerment and education for the community.

d. Convincing the community, especially the youth, in realizing diversity and living harmony in diversity.

e. Analyzing and correcting the root causes of the problems among the community in order to prevent radical ideology spreading in the community.

f. Restricting the media in presenting the quality of the news that may direct the community to the misconception towards the Violent Extremism.
Introduction

The majority of God-loving and law-abiding Muslims all over the world do not sympathise with or support any form of armed militancy. Unfortunately, the media, either by design or ignorance, has confused the public mind by labelling criminal militants in Muslim dominated territories like Iraq and Syria as Islamists, it has given Islam a bad reputation. The tendency to equate Islam with militancy has made it difficult to get the buy-in from the fence sitters who perceive that they have been unfairly targeted.

The term Islamophobia—the fear of Islam—when in actual fact the society should fear criminals and those who commit violence irrespective, whether they are Muslim or otherwise. Hostility towards Islam has led many non-Muslims to malign Islam. Maligning Islam will further embolden violence among Muslims who have turned to militancy. While the number who have turned militants is anyone’s guess. There are over 1.6 billion (2010) Muslims in the world. With 7 billion people in the world, that means about 23 percent of the world’s population are Muslim. If 100,000 have been radicalised, it only represents 0.01% of the Muslim population in the world.

My own estimate is that no more than a few thousand have joined the like of the Al Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) put together. Yet this small number has been magnified to give the impression that the entire 1.6 billion Muslims are to be feared as potential militants.

Much of Islamophobia has to do with local politics and geopolitics at the international level. Locally, at least in some European countries, there is the unfounded fear as the Muslim population rapidly expands (naturally and via immigration processes), they will take over the ballot box and tilt the existing political power balance in their favour. To me, this is wishful thinking. Globally, the hostility towards Islam by some states is grounded in the wrong conviction that political Islam is a monolithic force that can disrupt the global order. Hence, the war on “global terror” against many dissident militants who dared challenge the American strategic interests in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, for example. The untold truth that the dissidents (together with mercenaries) take up arms against the foreign powers
occupying their land is often conveniently ignored. Despite denials to the contrary, there is little doubt the West has a prejudiced view of Islam as a monolithic political force that can undermine and erode further global support for liberal democracy, the West promotes as their “religion”.

The hostility towards Islam is linked to the continued preservation of the liberal form of democracy that is championed in the West as the best form of political governance in the world. A recent study reports “that over the past 25 years, people have progressively lost faith in democracies, instead turning to “a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament or elections.” The study further notes that “Throughout Europe and the US, this political re-alignment is quite considerable, they note, and is seen disproportionately among younger demographics — which makes things even more worrying. They christened the process “deconsolidation,” a tip of the hat to the traditional view that once a democracy takes roots and ‘consolidates,’ it’s there to stay.”

The decline of democracy in the West is self-inflicted. It has nothing to do with Islam or militancy.

Islam is the chosen way of life of 1.6 billion people, usually law abiding and God-fearing. Yet many peace-loving Muslims are often blamed for the bad conduct of a few thousand criminals. The mainstream media is partly responsible for pushing this narrative. In my view, the international media must be more objective. Lumping the bad apples with good ones will only spoil the reputation of the majority and it will play into the hands of the small number of who have turned to militancy to redress their social, psychological and cultural grievances in the society. The media has a duty to differentiate Islam as the legitimate chosen way of life from the activities of bad Muslims.

Militancy exists in all religions

Militancy exists in all religions; not only in Islam. Yet, mainstream media tends to focus more on the activities of Muslim dissidents and downplaying on intolerance/suppression/hostilities against Muslims, for example, in Palestine, Burma, India and Sri Lanka.

The prejudices against innocent Muslims in some European countries, for example, are indeed puzzling. In certain “civilised societies”, Muslims are not allowed to practice their religion in public and openly express and manifest their identity. For example, in the Netherlands and France Muslim women are not allowed to wear face-veils apparently for security reasons but women of other religious denominations are free to wear what they like including veils. This discrimination against Muslim women is likely to increase in the future as more people adopt Islam as a way of life.
According to Pew Research Centre, “Islam is not only the world’s second-largest religion (after Christianity), but the Muslim population is also the most rapidly growing major religious group. This research estimates that the global Muslim population will grow from 1.6 billion in 2010 to nearly 2.8 billion in 2050. Based on Pew Research Centre projections, the Muslim population in Europe will increase from about 43 million in 2010 to nearly 71 million in 2050 due to several factors including age structure, migration, and high fertility rates of young Muslims.” Demographic distribution will have an influence on political power balance in any democratic society that relies on one person, one vote system. There is an assumption that their number increases, the Muslims will form a strong voting bloc. One report suggests that Islamophobia has become “a real danger to the foundations of democratic order and the values of the European Union.”

One study finds that “prejudice against Muslims was more widespread than prejudice against other immigrants, and that the effects of individual and country-level predictors of prejudice resemble those found in research on anti-minority prejudice in general. Fairly similar results were obtained for both Eastern and Western Europe, but the aggregate levels of prejudice are higher in the East. Our results imply that Muslims in Europe were particularly prone to becoming targets of prejudice, even before the attacks of September 11. The results give some support to group-conflict theory, mainly with regard to the effects of the unemployment. However, the size of Muslim population in a country does not seem to increase the level of anti-Muslim prejudice.”

Perceiving Muslims especially their women as a security threat, for example, have produced an uncomfortable and hostile environment for the law-abiding Muslims living in Western countries. Considered a threat to Western values and culture, Muslims are seen as “out of place”. One result of growing Islamophobia, in Europe, according to some studies, has to do with the political power structure in those societies and the competition over “entitlement to employment or other benefits of place and residency.”

Profiling Muslim women’s lifestyles and their reasons to wear a veil, for example, ignores their basic human right and an outright form of discrimination. The lifestyle of a person and the type of dress is highly influenced by factors such as cultural backgrounds and the social and political environments they live in and are shaped by. Therefore, it is neither easy nor precise to place all of these women in one broad social category as a threat to security and or be treated as a social dissident.

Violence does not have to be physical, the psychological form of violence can be as traumatic. And, when a suppressed person responds in a violent way to the mistreatment, especially if a Muslim were to do it, she or he will be quickly labelled as a terrorist to be locked up. But non-Muslims involving in in gun-violence cases in America, for example,
are given different treatment. Imagine if Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols who bombed a building in downtown Oklahoma City in April 1995 killing more than 168 people and injured more than 680 others and damaged more than 324 other buildings were Muslims how would they be treated?

Discriminating Muslim women not only strip these women of their dignity, but also lead to social exclusion. Many Muslim women who have experienced verbal or physical abuse have not reported the crimes because they do not want to make the situation worse or because they lack confidence that their case will be taken seriously. Introducing a separate profile to record Muslim hate crimes, such as they have proposed in the UK, might solve part of the problem, but it will not tackle the roots of it.

A study was conducted in Belgium to examine why the wearing of the Islamic veil by Muslim women has become a source of social tensions in Western European countries. Results confirmed other similar studies of the existence of deep prejudices bordering racism, based on values as well as religious attitudes “in predicting greater levels of anti-veil attitudes beyond the effects of other related variables such as age and political conservatism”. The studies also suggest that anti-veil goes beyond political conservatism and other considerations. The studies also suggest the importance of including religious attitudes as part of the intergroup-relation factors that predict attitudes towards immigrants, at least with regard to specific components of intercultural relations.

Rising Islamophobia in Europe

In the report on Islamophobia, the authors pointed to its rise in Europe to the point that Islamophobia has not only become a real danger to the foundations of democratic order and liberal values of the European Union; “it has also become the main challenge to the social peace and coexistence of different cultures, religions and ethnicities in Europe.” In their view, Islamophobia has gravitated towards “institutional racism” in Europe. In particular, they see Muslim women as among the most vulnerable direct victims of Islamophobia. I see the current anti-migration policy in some parts of Europe as an extension of Islamophobia by other means. Under this pretext, even the God-fearing Muslims are not spared.

Profiling Islam as a threat to global peace and a threat to civilisation is a travesty of justice. Although Professor Samuel Huntington was not the first “scholar” to openly malign Islam his article on the clash of civilisations, Foreign Affairs (1993) that talks of conflicts post-Cold War era among the different cultures in the world, his piece has done most damage to understanding Islam, following the end of the Cold War. In his article, he cited China and Islam as the probable threats to Western Civilisation (read liberal democracy).
Militant Islam was later blamed for the attack on the World Trade Centre on 9/11/2001 that became the focus of the US policy on the “war against terror”-ostensibly an all-out war against Islam. Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and many other with Muslims majority states in the Middle East were invaded and occupied for allegedly hosting militants wanted by America and its allies.

The facts do not support the narrative that the perpetrators of 9/11 were “Islamic militants” when they could be appropriately labelled criminals from some Arab countries. The emphasis on Islam is misplaced.

The first target of US wrath on the war against terror -read against militants-was the Al-Qaeda and its associates. The world conveniently forgot that the CIA trained and funded these fighters against the Soviets in Afghanistan in late 1970s. Similarly, ISIS was funded and trained by the US to deal with those fighting US interests in Iraq and Syria. Like the Al-Qaeda, ISIS were hunted down as enemies when they no longer served US political and security interests. As often, the force unleashed against the militants was not proportionate and goes contrary to the best practices in international law. The extreme form of abuse and torture of the prisoners of war at Al Ghrailb in Iraq speaks volume of human right transgression. Such abuse is an affront not only to civilisation. Its discriminatory application has put off many anti- militancy bona-fide Muslim fence sitters not to support the US policy on the war against terror, for example.

Many Governments in Western countries should use the social media to reign in prejudices against Muslims and instead work towards promoting an all-inclusive form of governance. The prejudices against Islam in Europe does have an impact on the criminal activities in the region looking for excuses to support their cause here and elsewhere.

Often the members of the public do not know the real truth. For example, how many people know of the forty-four organisations listed by the European Union as terrorist entities (2015) only five from religious organisations? Similarly, in the US, of the 260,000 murders committed from 2001 to 2017, only 140 murders were committed by Muslim American extremists, according to a study at North Carolina University at Chapel Hill.

According to Christopher Ingraham “since 2014, the number of non-gun homicides in America rose by less than two percent, from 4,864 in 2014 to 4,947 in 2016. But during those same two years, the number of gun homicides rose by more than 30 percent, from 11,000 to well over 14,000. Put another way, guns alone accounted for nearly 98 percent of the observed murder rate increase between 2014 and 2016. All told, in 2016-gun homicides made up 74.5 percent of all homicides in the United States - the highest share in well over 80 years of complete federal data.”
Another Report suggests that more Americans were killed by home-grown right-wing extremists than by Muslim militants. Since Donald Trump took office as President, “more Americans have been killed by white American men with no connection to Islam than by Muslim terrorists or foreigners” asserts another authority.

The reality is political violence in America is largely home-made, perpetrated by homegrown criminals. It has nothing to do with Islam and yet President Donald Trump found it necessary to ban the entry of bona-fide Muslims from six countries in the Middle East on the ground that they were a security threat!

On 28 June 2018, a non-Muslim white man killed five journalists working for “The Capital Gazette newspaper in Maryland”. Imagine the chaos if the perpetrator had been a Muslim.

**Militancy is society specific**

While motivations for militancy are society-specific, most militants fight, among others, for basic human rights including the right to practice religion, the right for an abode and the right to education. They also fight against suppression and discrimination. Many fought for self-esteem, dignity and group identity. Militancy will continue to thrive in societies where basic human rights are frequently violated. Sociologists inform us that militancy thrives best in dysfunctional societies.

Recent spike in militant activities in some societies in Southeast Asia is quite worrisome. However, the activities have been quite isolated to cause region-wide alarm. I distinguish militancy from terrorism. The latter is only the tool of the trade. Terrorism and violence is their trade mark or business model. As why some parts of the region are more “susceptible” to militancy has been the subject of many intellectual discourses. However, like piracy at sea, the problem of political violence is inherent in human societies.

Hannah Arendt and Ted Gurr, among others, remind us that removing the root of political violence in human societies has been an enduring challenge. Despite all effort, the world has not been able to completely rid of political violence is like day dreaming of eradicating poverty from the surface of the earth!

Certain quarters are apprehensive of Southeast Asia becoming a new hotbed of militancy, post-Syria conflict. They point to the recent urban uprising (May-October, 2017) by the Abu Sayyaf and the Maute brothers at Marawi, the Philippines, and the threat from the displaced Rohingya who were forcefully expelled in 2015 from the Rakhine state.
Although a mass exodus of militants from Iraq, Syria, Libya and Afghanistan is unlikely, some mercenaries have returned to the region; a few were allegedly involved in instigating and supporting militant-cum-criminal activities in Mindanao and Indonesia.

Why the region has attracted militancy remains a question mark. However, most studies show NO one single factor can explain preference for militancy. Poverty did not drive Osama Ben Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri to the Al Qaeda. Neither higher education militates against militancy. A few from Malaysia who became criminals-cum-militants in the Philippines were well educated. For example, the late Dr Azahari Husin, a demolition expert graduated with a Ph D in Engineering from a British University. Dr Mahmud Ahmad reportedly killed at Marawi was senior lecturer in a local University in Malaysia.

The World Bank believes poverty and underdevelopment were instrumental in the recent militant uprising at Marawi. However, in my view the problem of political violence in South Philippines goes back to the 1521 when Spain colonised the Philippines and put the Moros under their rule. The colonial powers have resisted efforts to grant even limited political autonomy to the Moros. This anti-Moro policy was continued into this day. Different political groups from the Moro community have negotiated for limited autonomy since the Presidency of Corazon Aquino, through Fidel Ramos, Joseph Estrada, Arroyo-Macapagal and Benigno Aquino. President Rodrigo Duterte has promised some form of political autonomy to the Moros under a proposed Federal System in the Philippines. He is also reported to have agreed to sign the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) into law to establish the Bangsamoro Region replacing the existing Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) during his third state of the nation address (SONA) address on 23 July 2018.

**Should the region worry of security threats from militants in the region?**

In the short term, it may be in the affirmative. However, in the long term—it is emphatically NO. Why not?

**First,** the region has defeated almost all forms of political violence including insurgency and irredentism before with the exception of some hard-core irredentist/nationalist organisations as some parts in the Philippines;

**Second,** the objective conditions that could encourage the blossoming of militants are not present, except in certain societies.
Third, like all past insurgencies and irredentist movements they tend to fade away over time with good governance. As long as the region views militancy as a threat to be commonly met, the opportunity of nipping-the-threat-in-the-bud exists. However, before the fad fades away we must brace for some challenges.

Political violence has been part of regional political landscape especially during the colonial period. To suggest that political violence has been part of our history is indeed an understatement. Political uprisings, often accompanied by violence and armed insurrections have taken place in colonial times in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya, Vietnam and Myanmar, for example. In some cases, the political uprisings as well as social movements against social injustice in the region have resulted from decades of suppression of minority rights. Some of the current armed insurrections in South Philippines is also carry-over from the unfinished nation-building challenges since the colonial days as well as a manifestation of their unfinished struggles for political independence/autonomy.

We can, however, mitigate the impact of shared challenges of militancy and extremism in the region by sharing experiences and intelligence as well as working together to nip-it-in-the-bud and defeat the extremists. The importance of regional collaboration to address the shared challenges of militancy and violent extremism needs no elaboration. Apart from the existing bilateral and region-wide mechanisms of sharing intelligence on militant activities, our successful joint enforcement effort in combating militancy, especially at sea, has gone unappreciated. For example, the media rarely reports on the successful coordinated patrols in the Straits of Malacca and the trilateral patrols in the Sulu Sea against violence at sea.

Besides joint enforcement action, an important aspect of mitigating militancy is education to prevent the process of radicalisation and extremism. While every home must become the bastion against radicalisation and extremism, the social media must be at the forefront of censorship against publications that incite, for example, lone wolves and groups to violence and radical thinking.

Teachers especially must be thought on how to prevent violent extremism through education.

On another point. Honouring militants as Jihadists-fought in the name of Islam-helps their cause and shows ignorance. Criminals, murderers and sinners are NOT Jihadists. The “badge of honour” gives them a wrong sense of entitlement, empowerment and achievement. The media must NOT glorify their violent deeds.
Concluding remarks

Islamophobia has been the driving force that unwittingly feeds into militancy among the few radicalised Muslim dissidents in some societies in Southeast Asia. The alternative narrative to Islamophobia is to separate criminality with the accepted way of life. Demonising Islam as a militant way of life will embolden the militants and criminals who make use of religion to support their violent cause.

While a very small number of Muslims have turned militant, militancy is not inherent in Islam. Nor the preserve of any particular religion. The Irish Republican Army traced its militant activities from the Catholic and Irish nationalism. The Lords’ Resistance Army terrorising many states in Central Africa began as a Christian Army movement in Uganda. Buddhism in Myanmar should not be blamed for the activities of a few right-wing monks for what U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres described as “ethnic cleansing” against the Rohingya.

Managing militancy and political violence will be more daunting in the future when states use militant proxies to advance interests. The use of militant proxies in Syria and Yemen, for example, has widened the scope of military operations on the ground and at the same time, make it more difficult to put an end to local conflicts when the interests of big powers overlap with those of local powers. What started as a civil war in Syria, for example, has now become the battle ground for regional proxies and big power politics. Russia, United States, Iran, Turkey, Lebanon, Israel and Saudi Arabia, among others, still have boots on the ground in Syria vide their proxies although the supposedly Islamic caliphate has been destroyed and no longer poses a threat.

Although there are a few soft-spots in Southeast Asia that militants can exploit, on the whole, the region is safe. What happens in Iraq and Syria will not be replicated here.
Countering violent extremist narratives

Lieutenant Colonel Vu Cao Dinh
Deputy Director of Military Science Information Division, Institute for Defence Strategies
Ministry of National Defence
Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

In recent years, violent extremism is on the rise on a global scale in general and in Southeast Asia in particular. After successive defeats in Iraq and Syria, militant groups have enhanced dissemination of violent extremist narratives in Southeast Asian nations with the aim of radicalization, recruitment and fundraising. Activities of these organizations are posing serious threats to security in the region and each nation, which requires countries to make joint efforts to settle this issue.

Proliferation of violent extremist narratives

Today, extremist organizations are exploiting violent extremist narratives to disseminate and propagandize value which goes against humanitarian norms and human rights; induce people to participate their organizations; and raise funds for their operations.

By means of the Internet and social networks, violent extremist narratives are being disseminated easily and rapidly reach people from various walks of life in the world. These narratives are the reasons for inciting hatred among individuals and organizations, urging them to advocate or engage in antigovernment activities which go against the majority of people’s aspirations for peace and prosperity, and result in social instability. More alarmingly, these narratives remain potent drivers of many local and international conflicts, which have caused tens of thousands of innocent people to die.

In Southeast Asia, due to historical circumstances and geographical conditions, local communities and peoples in regional countries witness uneven development in the economic, cultural and social realms. There are considerable disparities in intellectual levels and social activities between people living in urban and rural areas as well as between those living in flatland and mountainous areas. People from ethnic minorities, in particular, still face a lot of difficulty in socio-economic development. This is the opportunity for violent extremist organizations to disseminate anti-government narratives; exploit shortcomings and weaknesses in the implementation of ethnic and religious policies to sow the seeds of discord, foment violent extremism, create pretexts for intervention in internal affairs of countries, and even spark riots and social insecurity.
Against the backdrop of vigorous development of modern science and technology, especially the fourth industrial revolution, violent extremist organizations are taking advantage of information technology and mass media to step up dissemination of their violent extremist narratives, which exerts adverse influence on social order and security in many regional countries.

**Vietnam’s perspective on countering violent extremist narratives**

Vietnam is a multi-racial and multi-religion country with 54 ethnic groups, 6 major religions which have about 20 million followers, and other small religious groups. Vietnam’s consistent policy on promoting solidarity and harmony between various ethnic groups and religions, and ensuring equality and impartiality has contributed to maintaining national solidarity and harmony throughout the history of national defence and development.

Vietnam believes that there are many causes which lead to the proliferation of violent extremism in Southeast Asia, including hunger, poverty and backwardness; gap between regions and countries; unresolved racial and religious conflicts; and adverse effects of regional integration and connectivity. Countries, therefore, need to analyze the nature and causes of violent extremism in order to proactively find holistic solutions to the problem. Special importance should be attached to adopting policies on social security, hunger eradication and poverty alleviation, social justice and equality, and building resilient communities.

Today, one of the challenges that hinders the fight against violent extremist narratives in the region is difference in the concept of violent extremism. This difference is a barrier to promoting effective, intrinsic cooperation between governments, as well as between governments and international organizations. This reality requires parties concerned to continue to hold dialogue and discussion so as to reach an agreement on the concept of “violent extremism.” This will lay the foundation for achieving consensus and realizing measures to counter violent extremist narratives on the global, regional and national scales.

In addition, the global nature of the Internet means that a single nation cannot effectively deter and deny information, narratives and video clips which contain inappropriate content, violent extremism and distorted information. These are illegal acts that need to be countered and removed thoroughly. Law enforcement agencies from different nations should strengthen cooperation on controlling and countering websites disseminating violent extremist narratives, including terrorism; improve bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms for preventing and combating violent extremism; and regularly hold regional and international forums for information sharing, experience exchange and finding approaches to counter violent extremist narratives. Moreover, cooperation
between governments as well as between governments and major Internet companies such as Google, Facebook, YouTube, etc., is of significant importance, which plays a decisive role in countering violent extremist narratives on the Internet and social networks.

Furthermore, it is important to enhance education and propaganda to increase people’s awareness of racial and religious policies of states, bad influence of violent extremist narratives and hypocrisy of violent extremist organizations. The content of propaganda needs to place a strong emphasis on strengthening solidarity between ethnic groups and religions and the great national solidarity. Methods of dissemination must be carefully selected to ensure their congruence with characteristics, conditions, culture, and development levels of areas and localities. Countering violent extremist narratives must be the task of the whole society.

Conclusion

The fight against violent extremist narratives in Southeast Asian nations has achieved initial results, which contributes to maintaining a peaceful, stable environment in the region. Nevertheless, as long as violent extremist organizations and the seeds of radicalization still exist, the struggle to prevent and counter violent extremist narratives remains tense and complex. Nations should continue to execute policies and programs on socio-economic development, and racial and religious policies to promote solidarity and harmony between ethnic groups and religions, ensuring equality and impartiality. They also need to step up education and propaganda with a view to raising people’s awareness of countering distorted allegations and violent extremist narratives created by violent extremist organizations while enhancing international cooperation in this field.
The United Nations Security Council increasingly emphasises the need for a comprehensive approach to countering the spread of terrorism and violent extremism. One aspect of such an approach has come to be known as countering violent extremism (CVE). In its resolution 2178 (2014), on stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), the Council underscores that CVE is an “essential element” in addressing the threat to international peace and security posed by FTFs. The Council encourages Member States to engage with relevant local communities and non-governmental actors in developing strategies to counter the violent extremist narrative that can incite terrorist acts. States are also called upon to address the conditions conducive to the spread of violent extremism, including by empowering youth, families, women, religious, cultural and education leaders, and all other concerned groups of civil society, and promoting social inclusion and cohesion.

The adoption of resolution 2178 (2014) is in part a natural extension of the Counter-Terrorism Committee’s long-standing approach to the implementation of Security Council resolution 1624 (2005), which calls on States to prohibit incitement to commit acts of terrorism and to counter incitement motivated by extremism and intolerance. In its preamble, resolution 1624 (2005) stresses “the importance of the role of the media, civil and religious society, the business community and educational institutions” in efforts to enhance dialogue and broaden understanding, in promoting tolerance and coexistence, and in fostering an environment that is not conducive to incitement of terrorism.

Initiatives for countering incitement and violent extremism can take many forms. Common to all methods is an emphasis on dialogue, inclusion, and the promoting of understanding. States have, for example, created forums for interreligious and intercultural dialogue, or platforms that bring together governmental and non-governmental actors to advise on CVE strategies. Similar steps have been taken in the fields of education and religion. CVE measures also include initiatives for counter-messaging and the use of social media and other communications channels to counter terrorist narratives and promote alternative visions based on respect for human rights and human dignity.

Central to the concept of CVE is the importance of addressing the “conditions conducive” to the spread of terrorism, which are defined by the General Assembly in the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The Security Council has recognized that acts of terrorism cannot be prevented through repressive measures alone. It is also
essential to take account of grievances that may be exploited by terrorists and their supporters and to develop constructive solutions.

In 2015, the Council adopted resolutions that highlighted in particular the importance of including women and youth in CVE strategies. The Council’s resolution 2242 (2015) urges Member States and the United Nations system “to ensure the participation and leadership of women and women’s organizations in developing strategies to counter terrorism and violent extremism.” Security Council resolution 2250 (2015) urges States “to consider ways to increase inclusive representation of youth in decision-making at all levels in local, national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflict, including institutions and mechanisms to counter violent extremism”.

In its assessments of Member States’ implementation of the relevant Council resolutions, the Committee and CTED place considerable emphasis on the steps taken by States to institute programmes and strategies to counter incitement, in accordance with resolution 1624 (2005), as well as to counter violent extremism. Wherever there are gaps, the Committee and CTED seek to bring States together with technical assistance providers to develop further initiatives in these areas.

In January 2016, the United Nations Secretary-General presented to the General Assembly a Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (PVE), which adopts a comprehensive approach to the challenge of violent extremism, encompassing not only ongoing and essential security-based counter-terrorism measures, but also systematic preventive measures that directly address the drivers of violent extremism at the local, national, regional and global levels. In July 2016, the Assembly adopted a resolution referencing the Secretary-General’s Plan of Action and invited Member States, regional and subregional organizations to consider developing national and regional plans of action to prevent violent extremism as and when conducive to terrorism. The Committee and CTED are committed to ensuring coordination of their efforts with those being made in support of the PVE Plan of Action, including through CTED’s participation in the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF).
Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), Radicalization and Terrorism

Joint Statement of Special ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting 23 October 2017

WE, the Defence Ministers of the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Republic of Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, the Defence Minister and Minister with Special Functions of Malaysia, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, the Minister of Energy and Industry at the Prime Minister’s Office of Brunei Darussalam, gathered here in Manila, Philippines on 23 October 2017;

RECALLING the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime dated 20 December 1997;

MINDFUL of the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism and the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, which, inter alia, undertakes to strengthen cooperation at bilateral, regional and international levels in combating terrorism;

REAFFIRMING our commitment to the Langkawi Declaration on the Global Movement of the Moderates adopted on 27 April 2015 which aims to promote moderation and tolerance as core values for the region and its peoples to ensure that it would continue to be a peaceful and prosperous region;

RECOGNISING the complexity of non-traditional security issues and the proactive roles that ASEAN defence establishments could play in addressing these issues as part of an integrated approach through collective efforts by strengthening regional and international cooperation to meet non-traditional security challenges;

NOTING that terrorism has multiple dimensions, manifestations and causes and respects no national boundaries;

CONDEMNING in the strongest terms the attacks carried out by violent extremists across the world, particularly in Southeast Asia including the attack by the Maute Group in Marawi City, Philippines, which led to casualties, destruction of properties, and displacement of people, among others;
DO HEREBY DECLARE to:

1) Explore and identify possible ways, mechanisms and creative approaches among ASEAN defence establishments to combat non-traditional security issues in order to contribute to the maintenance of regional and international peace, stability and prosperity;

2) Encourage stronger and cooperative intelligence sharing platform to facilitate the flow of information, in particular on terrorists and terrorist organisations, their movement and funding, and any other information needed to protect lives, property and the security of all modes of travel;

3) Develop and enhance collaboration with civil society, academic and other institutions to foster greater understanding and bridging the gap aimed at suppressing terrorism and violent extremism through continuous research, advocacy on peace and security and the promotion of moderation and tolerance to ensure a more comprehensive approach in combating terrorism and violent extremism; and

4) Increase cooperation and collective efforts in the spirit of ASEAN solidarity in countering terrorism and violent extremism which are common threats to ASEAN.
Countering Terrorism in ASEAN

Joint Statement by the ASEAN Defence Ministers
6 February 2018

We, the Defence Ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), note with grave concern the rise of terrorism in our region, perpetrated by individuals and groups with increasingly sophisticated and deadly tactics and weapons.

We condemn in the strongest terms the attacks carried out by terrorists in Southeast Asia and around the world, and express our deepest condolences to the families of the many innocent victims of these attacks.

In this regard, we are heartened by the strong collaboration among ASEAN and our external partners. This includes the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) Experts’ Working Group on Counter-Terrorism. We also welcome other sub-regional collaborative efforts such as the Malacca Straits Patrol, the Trilateral Cooperative Arrangements and the Our Eyes Initiative, and efforts under other sectoral bodies such as the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime. These exemplify the ASEAN spirit of regional cooperation and friendship.

However, the scale and complexity of the terrorist threat faced by our region continues to grow with the influx of returning foreign terrorist fighters and cross border movement of terrorists. The ASEAN Defence Ministers agreed to enhance counter-terrorism cooperation among our defence establishments, and with our external partners. We will step up practical cooperation through joint exercises and training, information sharing, and increase dialogue and sharing of best practices across ASEAN Member States.

We will explore new forms of counter-terrorism collaboration where ASEAN defence establishments can make meaningful contributions on account of their niche capabilities, training, and equipment. We will also strengthen cross-sectoral counter-terrorism cooperation with our partners in the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) and other ASEAN-led mechanisms through workshops, seminars, and other exchanges.

We will cooperate to counter terrorist propaganda and promote positive messages of respect, inclusion, and moderation, including through developing a compendium of regional counter narratives. In this regard, we welcome initiatives of centres within ASEAN which promote religious tolerance, inclusivity, and moderation.

Terrorism is a severe threat to ASEAN’s progress, prosperity, and very way of life. We remain resolutely committed to defeating this scourge for the benefit of the people of ASEAN.
Annex
# Annex I

## Programme

### Tuesday, 17th July 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Day</td>
<td>Participants Arrival at the Suvarnabhumi International Airport</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Samut Prakan Province</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Depart to Chonburi, Kingdom of Thailand (Transportation provided by SSC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1830 - 2100</td>
<td>Welcome Dinner, hosted by Representative of the Commanding General of National Defence Studies Institute (NDSI)</td>
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### Wednesday, 18th July 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>700 - 0800</td>
<td>Breakfast at the hotel</td>
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<td>Depart to CSS</td>
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<tr>
<td>0800 - 0900</td>
<td>Registration</td>
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<tr>
<td>0900 - 0930</td>
<td>Opening Speech by General Chaichana Nakkerd, Deputy Chief of Joint Staff, The Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters or Representative, Kingdom of Thailand</td>
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<tr>
<td>0930 - 0945</td>
<td>Group photo</td>
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<tr>
<td>0945 - 1035</td>
<td><strong>Session I: “Countering Violent Extremist Narratives”</strong> Honored Guest Speaker by</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>General Wanlop Rugsanaoh</strong>, Secretary-General of the National Security Council Office of the National Security Council, Kingdom of Thailand</td>
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<tr>
<td>1035 - 1100</td>
<td>Coffee Break/Soft Drink/Snacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100 - 1200</td>
<td><strong>Session I: “Countering Violent Extremist Narratives”</strong> +Honored Guest Speaker by</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- **Major General Zhang Jianguo**, Vice Chairman of China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS), People’s Republic of China

- **Mr. Richard Sears**, Dean of Admissions and Business Operations, Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI APCSS), United States of America

1200 - 1230  - Open Forum

1230 - 1330  - Lunch

1330 - 1500  **Session II: “Countering Violent Extremist Narratives in the Global Context”** Presentation by

- United Kingdom: **Ms. Margaret Tongue**, Deputy Head of Mission British Embassy, Bangkok

- France Republic: **Mr. Elyamine Settoul**, Lecturer in political science Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers

- People’s Republic of Bangladesh: **Professor Intiaz Ahmed**, Professor Department of International Relations University of Dhaka

1500 - 1530  - Coffee Break/Soft Drink/Snacks

1530 -1630  **Session II: “Countering Violent Extremist Narratives in the Global Context” (Continued)** Presentation by

- Republic of India: **Major General (Ret.) Dipankar Banerjee**, Director General Forum for Strategic Initiatives

- Islamic Republic of Pakistan: **Major General Muhammad Samrez Salik**, HI (M) Director General, ISSRA, National Defence University

- Commonwealth of Australia: **Professor John Blaxland**, Head of Department Strategic and Defense Studies Centre (SDSC), Australian National University

1830 - 2100  Official Dinner
Thursday, 19th July 2018

0700 - 0830  - Breakfast
- Depart to CSS, RTARF

0830 - 1000  **Session III: “Countering Violent Extremist Narratives: ASEAN Perspective”** Panel Discussions by representatives from ASEAN countries
- Brunei Darussalam: **Ms. Yura Suma Adnan**, Senior Research Officer SHHBIDSS
- Kingdom of Cambodia: **Captain HEK Lygenta**, Assistant to General Department of Research and Intelligence (GDRI)
- Republic of Indonesia: **First Admiral Dr. M. Adnan Madjid**, S.H., M.Hum Vice Dean, National Security Faculty, IDU
- Malaysia: **Professor Dr. Hamzah bin Ahmad**, (BA Hamzah), Director, Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, NDUM
- Republic of Singapore: **Dr. Jolene Jerard**, Research Fellow and Deputy Head International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) RSIS
- Socialist Republic of Vietnam: **Lieutenant Colonel Cao Dinh Vu**, Deputy Director, Military Science Information Division, IDS, MND

Moderator: **Air Marshal Saisak Kanpachai**, Advisor to National Defense College National Defense Studied Institute, Kingdom of Thailand

1000 - 1030  - Coffee Break/Soft Drink/Snacks
1030 -1100  - Open Forum
1100 - 1130  - Summary session by Honored Guest Speaker from CIISS and DKI APCSS
1130 - 1200  - Closing Speech by CDF or representative
1200 - 1300  - Lunch  
1300 - 1730  - Cultural Visiting
1830 - 2100  - Dinner

Friday, 20th July 2018

All Day  Participants Departure
Annex II

Important Information

I. Objectives and Goals:

1) To enhance the awareness and understanding of situations, and trends of violent extremism and violent extremist narratives.

2) To share experiences, innovative thoughts and perspectives among leading scholars, academic, institutions, military officers, government officials, think tanks, and other prominent guests on countering violent extremism and violent extremist narratives.

3) To find innovative approaches and effective strategies for countering violent extremism and violent extremist narratives.

4) To create an opportunity for promoting academic cooperation between ASEAN and other countries.

II. Scope:

In general, but not limited to, the scope of presentations and discussions should be within the aforementioned objectives and goals above, with foresight in enhancing peace, stability, and prosperity through collaboration and cooperation at the regional level or above. Furthermore, additional mutual issues of interests can be raised with cautions on sensitive ones. The material presented, views and opinions expressed in this seminar are intended for academic purposes only and do not represent official views of any authority or institute.

III. Areas of Interests and Key Words (Examples, but not limited to):

ASEAN Community Vision 2025, ASEAN Political-Security Blueprint 2025, ADMM, ADMM-Plus, ARF, non-traditional security threats, maritime security, piracy, preventive diplomacy and mediation, irregular migration, human trafficking, cyber security, terrorism and counterterrorism, counter violent extremism, religious and political extremism, transnational crimes, common security and defence policy, declaration of conduct (DOC), freedom of navigation in and overflight, superpower rivalries, bilateral/multilateral security cooperation, pandemics and natural disasters, conflict prevention/confidence building measures, territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity, non-interference principle, disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, strategic cooperation, implementation mechanism, etc.
IV. Requested works and sharing perspectives:

1) Each prominent/honored guest speaker is highly encouraged to submit an academic paper to the Strategic Studies Center (SSC) for distribution to all participants in the seminar. In condition, academic paper should submit to SSC two weeks before the event, to allow sufficient time for preparation and management. The papers could be sent via E-mails as shown in the contacts details or in the Reply Form.

2) All the submitted papers, presenting papers and materials, including the concluded opinions and perspectives shared, plus other important materials will be compiled and published as collected works, later on. In addition, all the submitted files and presentations will be compiled together and then redistributed back to all participants possibly by files on the CD/DVD, or on the SSC Website.

V. Abbreviation:

CDF: Chief of Defence Forces

CLAWS: Centre for Land Warfare Studies

CICIR: China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations

CIISS: China Institute for International Strategic Studies

CSS: Center for Strategic Studies

DK.I, APCSS: Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

IDS: Institute for Defense Strategy

IDU: Indonesian Defense University

ISSRA: Institute for Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis

MiDAS: Malaysia Institute of Defence and Security

MND: Ministry of National Defence

NDSI: National Defence Studies Institute
NDUM: National Defence University of Malaysia
RSIS: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
RTARFHQ: The Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters
SHHBIDSS: Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
SSC: Strategic Studies Center
SDSC: Strategic and Defense Studies Centre
USAWC: United States Army War College

VI. Hotel Accommodations:

The SSC will arrange and provide an accommodation for all invited participants. The invited participants inform to the SSC all necessary information for the reservation by filling in all “required” fields need in the Reply Form and then sent back to the SSC.

The Tide Resort:
Address: 44/1 Bangsaen Beach 1 Rd. Tumbo Saensuk, Ampur Mueng Chonburi 20130, Thailand
Tel: +66 (0) 38 399-200
Fax: +66 (0) 38 399-299
E-mail: contact@thetide-resort.com
Website: http://www.thetide-resort.com

Traditional Thai Way of comfort and convenient for all your pleasure. Bangsaen’s latest and most luxurious hotel is The Tide Resort. The hotel has an enviable setting in landscaping gardens, only a few meters away from Bangsaen’s famous beach. It is centrally positioned on a lively promenade and accessible to all Bangsaen’s major attractions. This elegant modern building houses 154 luxurious rooms, a pleasantly shaded swimming pool and a fine restaurant serving international cuisine. The welcoming staff attend to guest’s every need with the traditional hospitality for which Thailand has become famous over the world. The Tide Resort is the perfect gateway destination, for tourist and locals alike.

Facilities & Service: There are many facilities including post & mailing service, hotel shuttle bus service, limousine service and car rental, gift shop, outdoor swimming pool, the children pool and Jacuzzi, fitness center, stream room and sauna room.
VII. Transportations:

The SSC will provide transportations for all coming participants to-and-from the Suvarnabhumi International Airport and the hotel in Bangsaen, Chonburi, Thailand.

VIII. Expenses:

The SSC will cover expenses for invited participants of accommodation, meals, local transportation, and activities as specified in the programme.

X. Attires:

17th July 2018
Welcome Dinner : Smart Casual

18th July 2018
Seminar : Suit with tie or Formal attire
Official Dinner : Smart Casual

19th July 2018
Seminar : Suit with tie or Formal attire
Cultural visiting and Dinner : Smart Casual

20th July 2018
Participant Departure : Casual

IX. Weather:

Chonburi has a tropical savanna climate (Köppen climate classification AW). Winters are fairly dry and very warm. Temperatures rise until April, which is hot with the average daily maximum at 35.2 °C (95.4 °F). The monsoon season runs from May through October, with heavy rain and somewhat cooler temperatures during the day, although nights remain warm.

X. Useful Calls in Chonburi province:

Tourism Authority of Thailand Chonburi Office +66 3842 3990, +66 3842 7667
Tourist Police Station (Pattaya) +66 3842 5937
Bangkok - Pattaya Hospital +66 3825 9999
Ekchon Hospital +66 3827 3840 – 7
XI. Maps and Detailed:

The Tide Resort Hotel, Bangsaen, Chonburi Province, Thailand

The Center for Strategic Studies, The Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters (CSS, RTARFHQ)
XII. The points of contacts:

The points of contacts (PoCs) are listed below

1) Col. Pratuang Piyakapho
   Director of the Regional Studies Division, Strategic Studies Center
   National Defence Studies Institute
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4) Regional Studies Division, Strategic Studies Center
   National Defence Studies Institute
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   Telephone/Fax: +662 275 5716
Strategic Studies Center, National Defence Studies Institute (SSC, NDSI)

I. Structure:

II. History:

The Strategic Studies Center (SSC) was founded by the former Chief of Defence Forces, the visionary General Kriengsak Chamanand. The center was originally named the “Strategic Research Institute”, which officially founded on the 9 April 1979. The institute was to provide professional recommendations on strategies regarding politics, economics, socio-psychological issues, and defence aspects to higher commanders. The Strategic Research Institute was initially put under the National Defence College.

In 1990, the National Defence Studies Institute (NDSI) was founded. Then, the Strategic Research Institute was transferred to be under the NDSI. Later, on the 2 April 2009, the “Strategic Research Institute” was renamed the “Strategic Studies Center”, or SSC until today.
III. Mission:

The Strategic Studies Center (SSC) is responsible for planning and operations regarding studies, researches, and assessments of relevant strategic environments, which may have impacts on national security. The SSC regularly provides perspectives and professional recommendations on strategies and security to defence organizations and the government, having the Director of Strategic Studies Center as head.

IV. Vision:

The vision of the Strategic Studies Center is to be “A leading organization in building and disseminating security and strategy knowledge, aiming towards excellence in ASEAN”.

V. Management:

The Strategic Studies Center has 5 subordinate units as follows.

**Office of the Director:** The office is responsible for stipulating policies, coordinating, planning, directing, supervising all related works to achieve set goals and objectives in efficient manners.

**Planning and Project Division:** The division is responsible for policy and planning-relate works, project management, development, assessment and evaluation, as well as budgeting.

**Strategic and Security Research Studies Division:** The division is responsible for researches and studies on strategic environments related to strategic environments, domestic or international security issues, providing recommendations on strategies and policies at both Armed Forces and national levels, including producing strategy-related academic papers and personnel training.
Regional Studies Division: The division is responsible for researches and studies on security situations and trends at all levels, including those of ASEAN, the region, and the world. It is also responsible for producing related academic works and network-building with other related domestic and international academic institutions.

Support Division: The division is responsible for adjutant, administration, and personnel affairs, as well as premises security, logistics, and related works for information technology.

VI. Operations:

The center has played a key role as the “Think Tank” organization for the Armed Forces and the government on strategies and security issues. Every year, the center produces numerous high standard research and academic works, notably two issues of the Strategic Outlooks and Strategic Reviews, six papers of case studies, twelve papers of commentaries, and four quarterly SSC Update Journals. Moreover, the center also supports higher commanders and relevant units with detailed-analysis articles on security matters, called SSC Strategic and Security Focus, to name a few.

The center collects information provided through knowledge sharing, suggestions and recommendations from experts, also, analyses, and synthesizes them to produce required academic papers, and gives further recommendations on strategies and security for higher commanders and relevant organizations.

VII. The Center for Strategic Studies:

Recently, on the 8th August 2015, the RTARF has opened up the new research center at Khao Sam Mook, in Chonburi Province. The new research center is called the “Center for Strategic Studies, Royal Thai Armed Forces in the Honor of His Majesty the King’s 80th Birthday Anniversary”.

Strategic Studies Center National Defence Studies Institute
The new research center is an important historical site for recognition of the establishment of ASEAN, which has laid solid foundation for regional security and stability, as seen today. It was the place, in the year 1977, for negotiating and signing of the “Bangkok Declaration for the Association of South East Asian Nations”, or now, known as ASEAN.

VIII. Summary:

The Strategic Studies Center (SSC) firmly believes in peace and stability as the essential foundation for human progress and well-beings, which could be built upon knowledge, wisdom, and sharing visions among nations, also, possibly, enhanced by related academic networks and defence institutions.

SSC will remain steadfastness in knowledge-building within the realm of strategies for defence and security, in order to best serve the Armed Forces, and the nation.
Annex IV

The Center for Strategic Studies, The Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters (CSS, RTARFHQ)

The Center for Strategic Studies is a place of historical importance for Thailand. The Center was the residence for the former Prime Minister, also, was the place where ASEAN was established 50 years ago.

The Center for Strategic Studies, is intended to serve as a venue where commanders or academics from Thailand, ASEAN members, including the international community may conveniently hold conferences and seminars on strategies and related subjects for the purposes of enhancing security cooperation, in both regional and international level. The Center can also facilitate shared learning resources, exchanging of information, valuable experiences, and best practices in order to provide solutions to issues of mutual concerns.

The Center for Strategic Studies, will serve as a venue for hosting of conferences, seminars and training courses organized by the National Defence Studies Institute of the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters, including other agencies.
I. Objectives:

1) To provide a venue for hosting of conferences and seminars, where high ranking officials from various sectors e.g. military, police as well as civilian executives may exchange views and experiences on strategies, policies and other related subjects.

2) To provide a venue for hosting of training courses on strategic and security subjects, also to facilitate and promote forum for academic research on strategies and related planning.

3) To preserve the residence of Field Marshal Plaek Pibulsonggram, the former Prime Minister of Thailand, by means of public displays and museum.
II. The Residence of Field Marshal Plaek Pibulsonggram and the Birth Place of ASEAN

The residence was the place for welcoming the Foreign Ministers from the four neighboring countries. Under the administration of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, H.E. Dr. Thanat Khoman, then the Thai Foreign Minister, had envisioned the creation of the association of Southeast Asian Nations to promote collaboration among the countries on important matters of common interests. He then invited Mr. Tun Abdul Razak, the Deputy Prime Minister from Malaysia, Mr. Narciso Ramos, the Foreign Minister from the Philippines, Mr. Rajaratnam, the Foreign Minister from Singapore, and Mr. Adam Malik, the Foreign Minister from Indonesia, to have informal talks at “Baan Laem Than”. There, they had the meeting under cordial and friendly atmosphere, which was later described as the “Spirit of Bangsaen”. After that informal meeting in Bangsaen, those Ministers returned to Bangkok. They then agreed to establish the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or now widely known as ASEAN. They signed the “Bangkok Declaration for the Association of South East Asian Nations” at Saranrom Palace, inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, on the 8th August 1967 at 10:50.
III. Buildings and Facilities

Other than the residence of Field Marshal Plaek Pibulsonggram, former Prime Minister, which preserved as a museum, the Center for Strategic Studies holds 7 other major buildings as follows:

1) Six residences for speakers/lecturers
2) An accommodation building (80 rooms)
3) A convention hall
4) A recreation center
5) A residence for staff
6) A services building
7) A beach side accommodation building (30 rooms)
200-seat Conference Room
The International Seminar 2018

"Countering Violent Extremist Narratives in the Global Context"

at the Center for Strategic Studies, Royal Thai Armed Forces (CSS, RTARF)
Bangsaen, Chonburi, Thailand

Strategic Studies Center, National Defence Studies Institute

62 Vibhavadi Rangsit Rd., Dindaeng, Bangkok, 10400, Thailand.
Tel. & Fax : +66 2275 5716, Website : www.sscthailand.org, www.ssc.rtarf.mi.th